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Abstract 
Historians categorize eras of human civilization by the technologies those civilizations 
possessed, and so science and technology have always been hand in hand with progress and 
evolution.  Our group investigated chemical weapon use in the First World War because we 
viewed the event as the inevitable result of technology outpacing contemporary understanding. 
Along with the main investigation, this IQP overviewed WPI’s Great War related activities 
between 1914 and 1918. Further, this IQP includes an exhibition of World War I era artifacts, 
both to commemorate the centennial anniversary of the armistice and to gather data on modern 
interpretations of the conflict. We concluded that World War I is a prime example of the duality 
of science, and serves to warn against the misuse of technology.  
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Executive Summary 
 Historians categorize eras of human civilization by the technologies those civilizations 
possessed, and so science and technology have always been hand in hand with progress and 
evolution. The technology of the Bronze Age allowed humanity to create tools and grow to 
levels impossible in the Stone Age, the technologies of the Iron Age eclipse those of the Bronze, 
and the pattern repeats throughout recorded history. Yet no technology or scientific advancement 
arrives totally benign; the iron that allowed soldiers to better protect themselves in battle also 
allowed the construction of sharper and deadlier swords. In more contemporary times, nuclear 
physics has unlocked energy reserves previously hidden from humanity, but has brought with it 
the threat of total nuclear annihilation. No better time period than the early 20th century 
exemplifies this duality of technology; chemical processes that gave way to new medicines and 
fertilizers also brought forth chemical weapons and promoted explosives manufacturing.  
 Our group was interested in the First World War because we viewed the conflict as the 
inevitable result of technology outpacing contemporary understanding. The war saw the 
introduction or mass adoption of tanks, chemical weapons, machine guns, planes, and several 
other technologies, and the result was a war unlike any other in human history. Specifically, our 
group found an interest in the development, usage, and later disownment of chemical weapons 
by the major powers in World War I. Our IQP focuses on the change in perspective brought to 
chemical weapons by the Great War. The conflict initially saw gases as viable alternatives to 
conventional weapons, yet the end of the war saw those same weapons branded cruel and 
inhumane—this IQP is centered around understanding why chemical weapons were, and remain, 
branded as such. Our project was arranged differently than a standard IQP. Rather than focusing 
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on a modern technology and its effects, our IQP focuses on the historical ramifications of an old 
technology as to better understand the significance of emerging ones.   
 World War I took place between the years 1914 and 1918. As no living combatants or 
eye witnesses to the conflict remain, this IQP utilized both the analysis of documents and 
artifacts from the period and the examination and study of works written about those documents 
and artifacts. The primary source documents investigated and discussed were taken as works of 
their time, written by people who had lived through those events and lacked the knowledge of 
hindsight. Secondary source documents written at a later date by historians have the benefit of 
understanding the outcome of each decision in the war, and were useful tools to guide our 
research and aid our understanding of the overall conflict. Still, our group took special care in 
cross analyzing secondary sources as to minimize any possible misunderstandings arising from 
placing a modern interpretation on historic events. The standard of analysis for primary 
documents was necessarily different than for secondary documents. First hand accounts of the 
conflict often exaggerated events or, in the case of propaganda, fabricated false figures to further 
a specific narrative, while historical papers on the era were far less likely to contribute to that 
false narrative. Analysis of secondary documents was restricted to peer reviewed scholarly 
articles or journals, to published books, or to interviews with reputable experts on the time period 
as to allow for proper curation of the data.   
As an aside to the main investigation, this IQP also included an exhibition of World War 
I era artifacts as to both commemorate of the centennial anniversary of the armistice and to 
gather information about the familiarity of WPI students and faculty with the Great War. The 
exhibit took place at the Gordon Library on November 9th and 12th, the two weekdays closest to 
Armistice Day on November 11th. The main display exhibited various uniforms and gas masks 
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from various countries in the Great War, and also included a short survey for visitors to complete 
anonymously for data to be collected on the modern understanding of the First World War.  
Further, this IQP also included an appendix compiling WPI’s activities related to the 
Great War between 1914 and 1918. Learning about WPI’s specific involvement in the fighting 
allowed our group an understanding of the war on a personal level, while also allowing us a 
glimpse into the state of American preparedness for the conflict through the lens of a single 
institution.  
The Great War saw the major powers of Europe throw their full might at each other in a 
mass slaughter that lasted from 1914 to 1918. Chemistry was perverted from a science of healing 
and creation into a weapon of death and destruction. After World War I was over, the world 
came to the consensus that poison gases are inhumane and cruel weapons, and decided to never 
use them again in conflicts. Unfortunately, the decision to ban chemical weapons was only made 
after hundreds of thousands of people, both soldiers and civilians, were killed by them.  
Unfortunately, chemical weapons are often impossible to control on the battlefield; the 
gases go whichever way the wind blows and are blind to the difference between friend and foe or 
civilian and combatant. In essence, poison gases are indiscriminate weapons that target both 
civilians and soldiers alike, but are especially deadly to those who have no form of protection 
against the weapons. In such cases, gases serve only to compound the suffering of those they are 
used against.  
World War I serves as an example of the danger posed when science ceases to serve 
humanity and instead serves to destroy it. Still, the threat of war should not deter scientific 
progress—for every death chemistry dealt in World War I, it has since saved thousands. The 
Haber-Bosch process that provided Germany its explosives in the Great War has since allowed 
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billions of people to live without fear of starvation. Scientific advancement cannot be halted, and 
any attempts to do so will fail. Instead, scientific advancement should be unanimously pursued 
with the goal of aiding humanity, and never to harm it.   
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Part I: The Great War - The 
History and Analysis of Chemical 
Weapons 
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Article Abstract 
 
Chemical weapons are usually classed alongside nuclear and biological arms as highly 
regulated weapons of mass destruction, yet, historically, chemical weapons have produced 
surprisingly few deaths on the battlefield. When chemical weapons were used in World War I, 
though responsible for relatively few casualties as compared with other novel technology, they 
still gained a reputation as cruel, barbaric, and inhumane weapons. This paper analyzes the use of 
chemical weapons in World War I through the motives and actions taken by prominent figures in 
the conflict while anchoring the discussion within the framework of Just War theory. This paper 
argues that chemical weapons gained their disproportionately horrific reputation through a 
historical experience involving treaty violations, compounding the inherently indiscriminate 
nature of gas weapons, which undermined their potential to be used in the service of any “just” 
war.  
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Chapter 1: A Lasting Peace - Science and the 
Philosophy of War 
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Just War from Antiquity to WWI  
 On 1 November 1914, Pope Benedict XV wrote the first of his encyclicals to be 
distributed to the Bishops around the world. The Pope decided to make the first major statement 
of his Papacy about the war in Europe, which began just a month prior to his election in 
September of the same year. Benedict XV wrote about the loss of life and the horror of modern 
war due to the advanced weaponry being employed to accelerate the slaughter:  
The combatants are the greatest and wealthiest nations of the earth; what wonder, then, if, 
well provided with the most awful weapons modern military science has devised, they 
strive to destroy one another with refinements of horror. There is no limit to the measure 
of ruin and of slaughter; day by day the earth is drenched with newly-shed blood, and is 
covered with the bodies of the wounded and of the slain.1 
Though the loss of life would only continue as World War I raged on, Pope Benedict noted the 
death and destruction it had already caused in the first few months of fighting in 1914. The head 
of the Vatican directly mentioned modern military weapons as being part of the horror of the 
war, likely referring to artillery and machine guns, since the most infamous weapon of the war, 
poison gas, had not yet been used. The Pope called for an end to the fighting and bloodshed, and 
for the leaders of Europe to resolve their dispute in some other way than relentless slaughter.  
 Benedict’s statements expressed a moral reaction rooted in Catholicism’s advocacy for 
Just War Theory. Since antiquity, philosophers around the world have made attempts to form a 
conclusive ideology that would outline either the justification of a war, the conduct in which that 
                                               
1 Benedict XV. Ad Beatissimi Apostolorum. Encyclical Letter. Vatican Website. November 1, 1914. 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xv/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xv_enc_01111914_ad-beatissimi-
apostolorum.html. 
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war might be fought, or both.2 In Europe, revered philosophers dating back to Thucydides, 
Aristotle, and Plato placed conditions upon which a war could justly be waged, yet the ancient 
Greeks could not form a complete consensus on what these boundaries were.3 Much later, the 
idea of pacifism appeared as a common and popular ideology among the philosophers of the 
medieval era. Pacifism remained strong between the 18th and 20th centuries; one particular 19th 
century philosopher, Leo Tolstoy, believed that war itself was immoral because it involved the 
killing of humans by other humans. As a member of the Orthodox Church, Tolstoy questioned 
his own denomination, “how can so-called enlightened men preach war, support it, participate in     
it, and, worst of all, without suffering the dangers of war themselves, incite others to it, sending          
their unfortunate, defrauded brothers to fight?”4 Tolstoy was later excommunicated from the  
Orthodox church for his anarcho-pacifist beliefs which were in opposition to the church.5 Like 
their ancient counterparts however, modern philosophers could not form a consensus about the 
topic of just war, and the pacifistic interpretation became one of many prominent theories.  
                                               
2 An ancient Indian epic written in Sanskrit, Mahabharata, was written about the Kurukshetra War, and is the 
longest epic ever written. A major theme in Mahabharata is Dharmayuddha, most closely translated to “Righteous 
War” and its contrast with Kutayudda, or “Unjust War”. A conversation in the epic between five brothers discusses 
the proportionality of war, a just means of fighting, and a just cause for fighting. For instance, Mahabharata 
discusses how chariots should not attack cavalry, but instead should attack only other chariots. The epic also 
discusses the fair treatment of prisoners and the wounded, enshrines the safety of noncombatants, and bans the usage 
of “Divine Weapons” bestowed upon an army by the gods. Kaushik Roy, Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in 
South Asia: From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 28. 
3 Ancient philosophers such as Thucydides believed that war against invaders was not only just, but should be 
celebrated, saying that it is a “Most lawful act when men take vengeance upon an enemy and an aggressor”. 
Aristotle believed that a war to conquer uncivilized peoples would also be acceptable, having said war should be 
brought "against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such kind is 
naturally just.” Plato is more liberal in his interpretation of why a war should be waged, claiming that "at the root of 
all wars" is the desire of a nation to expand. Plato claimed that when "The original healthy state is no longer 
sufficient. . . . The country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small . . .” which will 
lead a country to expand and is a fact of nature that is unavoidable. Joachim Von Elbe, "The Evolution of the 
Concept of the Just War in International Law,". The American Journal of International Law 33, no. 4 (1939): 665-
666, doi:10.2307/2192879.  
4 Leo Tolstoy, “Count Tolstoy on the Russo-Japanese War," The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920) 66, no. 9 (1904): 
164. 
5 Ivan M. Andreev, "The Excommunication of Leo Tolstoy from the Orthodox Church," Orthodox Life, May/June 
1961. Some writers of the 18th to 20th centuries started to follow the idea of Positive International Law, which 
rejects the idea of a “just” and “unjust” war as a whole. Instead of justifying or condemning a war, followers of 
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Francis Lieber was a notable exception to the general advocation of pacifism among 
modern philosophers during the 19th century. Lieber was a German born during the French 
Revolution, whose first foray into battle was against Napoleon in 1815.6 Though he saw many of 
his fellow soldiers die, and he himself was wounded at the Battle of Waterloo, Lieber 
nonetheless claimed it was a positive overall experience.7 In 1816, Lieber became an advocate of 
Liberal Nationalism and fled his conservative Prussian government in 1821.8 Lieber first fled to 
Rome after hearing about the War of Greek Independence, then to England, and finally to the 
United States where he lived out the rest of his life from 1827 until his death in 1872.9 
 Lieber believed that war was sometimes not only necessary, but even beneficial under 
certain conditions.10 In Lieber’s mind, a legitimate war must be short, likely to succeed, must be 
fought in accordance to terms agreed upon by all warring parties, and should only be fought if 
the war would bring about a just result.11 Lieber believed that if all of his conditions for a just 
war were met, not only should the war be fought, it should actively be sought out by the party in 
a position to gain from it. Lieber’s philosophical ideology, though not necessarily accepted as a 
whole, has historical precedent in some of its points. In particular, his idea that a just war can 
                                               
Positive International Law would claim that the right to declare and conduct war is one inherent to a sovereign state, 
and so the ability to justify a war is also only possessed by that sovereign state. [Joachim] Von Elbe, ["The 
Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law,". The American Journal of International Law 33, no. 
4 (1939)]: 682-683, doi:10.2307/2192879.  
6 Daniel R. Brunstetter and Cian O’Driscoll, Just War Thinkers: From Cicero to the 21st Century (London, New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 181. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Brunstetter, 182. 
11 Brunstetter, 182, 186.  
 Lieber did not believe in fighting a war for simply for material gain if there was no greater motive involved. He was 
a supporter of conflicts such as the American Revolution, and believed that ideological differences were a valid 
reason for fighting a war. Brunstetter, 184. 
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only be fought on terms agreed upon by both sides is supported by the widespread signing of 
treaties regulating the conduct of warfare.  
 
Hague Conference of 1899 
Between the 12th and 24th days of August, 1898, the Russian Empire under Czar 
Nicholas II sent a letter to various diplomatic representatives of the major world powers. Count 
Mikhail Nikolayevich Mouravieff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent the letter as a 
proposition to hold a peace conference that would be attended by countries around the world. 
The Foreign Minister wrote that the goal of the conference would be “The maintenance of 
general peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations 
present themselves.”12 Though Mouravieff had kindled the idea of a peace talk, he had not sent 
the invitations for any conference just yet. The Foreign Minister’s instruction from his Czar was 
to send the letters out to weigh the interest of the major powers in holding such a conference 
before actually planning an event.13 Most major world powers appeared to show an interest in the 
conference and, on January 11 of the following year, Count Mouravieff sent another message to 
the powers, informing them of the positive reception of the letter. The Russian government was 
evidently pleased by the response by the rest of the world and began organizing a conference to 
be held at The Hague in the Netherlands.14 Per Count Moravieff’s letter, the conference was to 
                                               
12 "Russian Circular Note Proposing the First Peace Conference." Letter from Mouravieff. August 24, 1898. James 
Brown Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, Accompanied by Tables of Signatures, 
Ratifications and Adhesions of the Various Powers, and Texts of Reservations: Edited by James Brown Scott, 
Director (New York: Oxford University Press, 1915), xv. 
13 Ibid. 
14 The Hague was chosen to be the location of the conference because the Russian Government did not believe it 
would be proper for the conference to be held in the capital of one of the great powers. Instead, the Russians sent a 
request to Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands to ask that she grant permission for the conference to be held at The 
Hague. "Circular Instructions of the Netherland Minister For Foreign Affairs to Diplomatic Representatives. 
Invitations to the Conference." Letter from Willem Hendrik De Beaufort. April 6, 1899.James Brown Scott, The 
Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, Accompanied by Tables of Signatures, Ratifications and 
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discuss several main topics related to not only preventing war, but also to limiting its conduct in 
the event that war broke out in the future.15 The official invitations to The Hague Conference of 
1899 were sent out to the major world powers on April 6, 1899 by Willem Hendrik De Beaufort, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Netherlands.16 The conference, which was to be held on 
May 18 of the same year, did not limit the number of attending countries, but Beaufort's letter 
made a note that each member would have no more than one vote in the proceedings.17  
 The Hague Conference was meant to be, in part, a continuation of the conference held at 
Brussels in 1874, which was a broad and ambitious attempts to regulate the rules of warfare.18 
The conference at Brussels originated on the basis of a document written by Francis Lieber 
called the Lieber Codes, which Lieber wrote for the United States at the behest of Abraham 
Lincoln after the conclusion of the American Civil War.19 The conference at Brussels was 
designed to ratify, in an international sense, many aspects of the Lieber Code, including the 
handling of prisoners of war, protection of civilians and civilian property, and restrictions on 
certain forms of weaponry.20 Although the conference at Brussels was signed by only a small 
portion of the major powers at the time, it serves as an early glimpse into what many of the 
discussion points at The Hague Conference would be.21 The invitation to The Hague did not 
                                               
Adhesions of the Various Powers, and Texts of Reservations: Edited by James Brown Scott, Director (New York: 
Oxford University Press American Branch, 1915), xix. 
15 Mouravieff, Russian Circular Note Proposing the Program of the First Peace Conference. 
16 Willem, Circular Instructions of the Netherland Minister. 
17 Ibid. 
18 James Brown. Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. A Series of Lectures Delivered before the 
Johns Hopkins University in the Year 1908, by James Brown Scott, ... in Two Volumes. Volume II. Documents, vol. 1 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), 525. 
19 Ibid. 
In 2015, the United States Department of Defence published its Law of War manual, which explicitly refers to the 
Lieber Code and its influences on the modern document as well as its historical influence. 
Department of Defense Law of War Manual. Washington, DC: Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, 
2015. 
20 Attendees of the Brussels Declaration of 1874, Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War. Brussels (Brussels: International Red Cross, 1874). 
21 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, 525. 
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name those points directly, but did directly state that a point of discussion would be the 
“Revision of the declaration concerning the laws and customs of war elaborated in 1874 by the 
Conference of Brussels, and not yet ratified.”22  
 While the concept of The Hague Conferences seemed appealing to most European 
powers, the talks were not universally praised. Leo Tolstoy was not convinced by the stated 
purpose of The Hague. In May of 1899, shortly before the peace talks began, Tolstoy wrote “The 
[Hague] conference itself can be nothing but one of those hypocritical arrangements which aim 
not at peace, but, on the contrary, at hiding from men the one means of obtaining universal 
peace, which the foremost men are now beginning to discern.”23 Tolstoy’s scathing remarks were 
aimed at exposing the underlying assumption of The Hague Conference: war is inevitable and 
unavoidable.  
 On 18 May, 1899, the conferences at The Hague officially commenced, and on the 29th 
of July concluded with an agreed upon resolution limiting the rules of war.24 In particular, the 
great powers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom all signed sections of The Hague 
Conference which regulated warfare, three points of which would have great significance later, 
during the First World War.25 The first two points are found in Section II of The Hague 
Conference, which state “Besides the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is 
especially prohibited - (a.) To employ poison or poisoned arms; . . . (e.) To employ arms, 
projectiles or materials of a nature to cause superfluous injury.” The third point can be found in 
                                               
22 Mouravieff, Russian Circular Note Proposing the Program of the First Peace Conference. 
23 Leo Tolstoy, "Count Tolstoy's Opinion of the Peace Conference," The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920) 61, no. 5 
(1899). 
24 Certain sections of the document were not signed by some of the major powers. For instance, France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom signed Section IV Article II of The Hague which dealt with gas warfare, but the United 
States did not. Similarly, the United Kingdom declined to sign Section IV Article I which dealt with the dropping of 
bombs from air balloons, but Germany and France both signed this section.  
Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, 231. 
25 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, 231. 
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Section IV, written “To prohibit the use of projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion of 
asphyxiating or delirious gases.”26 These points were signed by the major powers in 1899, and 
the second point was agreed upon again in 1907 because its original implementation within the 
1st Hague Conference was designed to invalidate itself after five years.27 
 
Chemistry in Agriculture  
 In June of 1898, Sir William Crookes, a British chemist famous for his recent discovery 
of the new element Thallium, spoke at the gathering of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science in Bristol. Rather than speaking about his recently discovered element 
or another aspect of his research, Crookes issued a warning for Western civilization. Crookes 
foretold the impending mass-starvation of Western society due to its dependence on quickly 
depleting fertilizers to feed its people: 
It is of urgent importance to-day, and is a life-and-death question for generations to come. 
Many of my statements you may think are of the alarmist order . . . but they are founded 
on stubborn facts. They show that England and all civilized nations stand in deadly peril 
of not having enough to eat. As mouths multiply, food resources dwindle. Land is a 
limited quantity, and the land that will grow wheat is absolutely dependent on difficult 
and capricious natural phenomena. . . . our wheat-producing soil is totally unequal to the 
strain put upon it.28  
                                               
26 The Hague conventions of 1899, Section II Chapter I Article 23; Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations, 
116; The Hague conventions of 1899, Section IV 2; Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations, 26. 
27 The wording of the second point changed in 1907 to read “(e.) To employ arms, projectiles, or materials 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;” Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, 116. 
28 William Crookes, "Address of the President Before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Bristol, 1898," Science 8, no. 200 (1898): 562, doi:10.1126/science.8.200.561. 
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While Crookes began his speech with a rather grim and depressing sentiment, he used his 
position as speaker to implore the chemists around the world to find a solution to the Nitrogen 
issue. Crookes believed that the solution would not be found in a natural way, but that “It is 
through the laboratory that starvation may ultimately be turned into plenty.”29 Years later, a 
German chemist named Fritz Haber would eventually discover the means to turn atmospheric 
Nitrogen into usable ammonia while another German, Carl Bosch, would turn Haber’s laboratory 
experiment into a large scale operation within the German chemical giant, BASF. Though 
Bosch’s ammonia factories saw many setbacks, the chemical plants were fully operational by the 
winter of 1913. BASF saw profits soar as hundreds of tons of synthetic flowed from its factory at 
Oppau, and the Haber-Bosch process, as it would come to be known, would transform Western 
agriculture into a highly sophisticated patron of the chemical industry.  
 The early 20th century appeared as though it was the beginning of an era of peace and 
prosperity. With the First Hague Convention in 1899, followed by the Second Hague Convention 
in 1907, and a third meeting planned for 1915, peace was on the minds of many world leaders 
and military powers at the start of the century.30 BASF’s new chemical plant at Oppau began 
producing synthetic ammonia at a rate high enough to quell fears about the downfall of Western 
agriculture, and the future of Europe seemed full of promise.  
                                               
29 Ibid. 
30 James Brown Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, Accompanied by Tables of 
Signatures, Ratifications and Adhesions of the Various Powers, and Texts of Reservations: Edited by James Brown 
Scott, Director (New York: Oxford University Press American Branch, 1915), xiii. 
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The Shots that Sent the World to War 
 On June 28, 1914, Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were 
assassinated in Sarajevo by Serbian national Gavrilo Princip. Two bullets were all that was 
necessary for Austria-Hungary to declare war against Serbia, culminating in a war of alliances 
that pit Austria-Hungary and Germany against Serbia, Russia, and France. A century of relative 
peace in Europe had ended and the Great War (or the War to End All Wars) had begun.  
 The outbreak of war should not have been a surprise to anyone; the “peace” talks at The 
Hague had been initiated with the notion that war was an inevitability, a fact that was not lost 
upon pacifists like Leo Tolstoy.31 Even fairly recent European history showed long term peace 
was impossible. As new, deadly weapons were being designed and multiple minor conflicts had 
already broken out in and around Europe since the turn of the century, Europe was gearing up for 
a major bloodbath—even as the continent planned and held its Hague Conventions. 
 
Modern Arms: Gatling and Maxim 
 In the 1860’s, Richard Jordan Gatling finalized his work on a new model of firearm and 
hoped to sell it to the United States government.32 The Gatling gun was the first modern machine 
gun; it was crank operated and allowed a soldier to fire shots faster than any other weapon at the 
time. Though the Gatling gun did not receive much attention from the United States, it heavily 
intrigued other militaries around the world. By 1876, Russian troops were equipped with  
                                               
31 Tolstoy, “Count Tolstoy on the Russo-Japanese War," 66. 
32 Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New York: Gotham 
Books, 2006), 150. 
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approximately 400 Gatling guns, and used them to great effect in the Russo-Turkish War.33 No 
other weapons could match Gatling guns in terms of fire rate, but the awkward crank mechanism 
required to fire the weapon meant that it was not truly automatic. 
Hiram Maxim, another American inventor, took up the challenge of designing a fully 
automatic machine gun that could be operated with the simple pull of a trigger. Maxim was not 
known for creating firearms while he was working on his machine gun in the 1880’s; he had 
previously invented domestic items such as a curling iron and lightbulb.34 Maxim’s focus 
changed when he spoke to an American colleague during a visit to Vienna in Austria-Hungary, 
who had told Maxim, “Hang your chemistry and electricity! If you want to make a pile of 
money, invent something that will enable these Europeans to cut each other’s throats with greater 
facility.”35 Maxim eventually succeeded in his endeavor; his completed Maxim gun operated at a 
higher firing rate than the Gatling gun without the need for an awkward mechanical crank. 
Despite the clear advantages of the Maxim gun, however, many military powers were slow to 
adopt it.36  
The British army was the first military force to adopt the Maxim gun, though it did not do 
so in large quantities. The United Kingdom purchased its first Maxim guns in 1887, and by 1890 
had planned for each battalion to have one Maxim gun for training, but internal opposition in the 
military meant the integration progressed much slower than planned.37 By 1894, there were still 
many units without Maxim guns, and most soldiers were still training on old crank operated 
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Nordenfelt and Gardner guns.38 In Germany, the Kaiser was incredibly interested in the Maxim, 
claiming in 1902 that a battalion with machine guns could put an entire army corps in check.39 
Maxim entered a twenty year sales agreement with Germany in 1888, and negotiated a seven 
year manufacturing licensing agreement in 1892.40 The gun sold extremely well in Germany, and 
Maxim also found great success for his weapon in Russia.41 After a demonstration of the 
weapon, the Russian military was so impressed that it began incorporating Maxim guns into its 
ranks the same way it had with the Gatling only a few decades earlier.42 By 1904, each Russian 
division had a machine gun company comprised of eight Maxim guns. The power of the Maxim 
would soon be on display for the entire world to see.  
 
New Lessons in the Context of Modern War 
 The Russo-Japanese War began on February 8, 1904, and should have been an early 
indicator of how war would look in the twentieth century. Observers from America and across 
Europe were sent to the battlefields to analyze the fighting, and many made note of the new 
machine guns that were used. Some observers saw how effective machine guns could truly be, 
with one German writing, “In less than two minutes [the Russians] fired about a thousand 
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rounds, and the Japanese firing-line was literally swept away.”43 Others felt that machine guns 
were still effective, but not overly so. A British correspondent who had spent most of the war 
with the Russians, Maj. Montgomery Macomb, said machine guns "played a useful but not great 
part in the war." He claimed that a machine gun could do the job of only 50 men, not the 100 that 
some claimed. Further, Macomb noted each machine gun required 12 men to operate properly, 
meaning each machine gun only yielded a net positive of about 38 infantrymen as opposed to the 
advertised 99.44 Still, some military traditionalists seemed to completely disregard the tactical 
uses of machine guns in favor of infantry, with American Captain William V. Judson remarking, 
"nothing in the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated that, in field battles, the infantry had lost its 
supreme importance."45 Attitudes like Judson’s were not uncommon, especially among the 
French, who still followed the lessons of the Boer War; that nothing could stop an offensive led 
by highly trained infantry—a lesson that would lead to the deaths of tens of thousands of 
Frenchmen during the early months of the Great War.46 The Russo-Japanese War officially 
ended on September 5, 1905, less than a decade before the start of one of the largest war in 
European history.  
 
 
 
                                               
43 Ibid, 67.  
44 John T. Greenwood, "The American Military Observers of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)," Army History 
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France, Germany, and Neutral Belgium 
 The date that marks the beginning of World War I is still a subject of debate. The 
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand took place on June 28, 1914. The declaration of war by 
Austria-Hungary and Germany on Serbia took place on July 28 of the same year. Germany 
declared war on Russia on August 1st, declared war on France on August 3rd, and on August 4th 
invaded neutral Belgium, causing the United Kingdom to declare war on Germany that same 
day. August 4th marked the last declaration of war between major powers on the Western Front 
for nearly 2.5 years, and the events of that day would mark the tone of the rest of the war. 
 Of the countries that entered into the early war, Belgium was the only entity to be 
attacked that had no direct interest in the conflict that had erupted.47 France had publicly stated 
on July 31st “No incursion of French troops will take place into Belgium . . . France would not 
like to have the responsibility of committing in regards to Belgium the first act of hostility.”48 
Still, Germany sent a note to Belgium on August 2nd indicating that it believed France would 
attack through Belgium, and that Germany would be “under the obligation to prevent that attack 
and to violate Belgian territory.” The letter requested that Belgium treat Germany as friendly, 
and stated that Belgium had twelve hours to reply.49 That same day, Sir Edward Grey in the 
British House of Commons sent a telegraph to both Paris and Berlin requesting information 
about each country’s position on Belgian neutrality. France responded in a similar way to its 
statement on July 31, and Germany replied “The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not 
                                               
47 Germany and Austria-Hungary had joined the war together against Serbia. Russia had been allies with Serbia, 
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possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor." Later, the 
German Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that he may not be able to give a direct answer at 
all, as the answer might give away Germany’s campaign tactics.50 Two days later, Germany 
violated Belgian neutrality and marched its armies across the border, drawing the United 
Kingdom into the war.51 There is no historical question regarding why Germany had violated 
Belgian neutrality in the beginning months of World War I; the attack through Belgium was 
necessitated under the Schlieffen Plan, which aimed at knocking France out of the war as quickly 
as possible by flanking Paris via an attack through Belgium. 
 
Kriegsraison: The Necessity of War 
  Germany likely adopted the Schlieffen Plan in the first place because its military leaders 
strongly followed the Clausewitzian doctrine of kriegsraison. Prussian General Carl von 
Clausewitz, who lived from 1780 to 1831, was an influential war theorist whose unfinished 
book, Vom Kriege, or On War, focused on the philosophy of war and battle, with his most 
famous quote “War is just the continuation of politics by other means.” Clausewitz’s ideas were 
taken by many to dictate that “absolute war” was a necessary military doctrine, and his works 
were popular around the world, especially in Germany.52 The fifth edition of Vom Kriege was 
released in Germany in 1905, and contained a foreword by Chief of Staff Alfred von Schlieffen, 
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the mastermind behind the Schlieffen Plan.53 In 1914, Vom Kriege reached its peak popularity 
since its release in 1832, and the doctrine of Kriegsraison, based on Clausewitz’s works and 
most closely translating to “the necessity of war” was alive and well in Germany. 54 
 Kriegsraison follows the idea that the outcome of a war is more important than the 
manner in which the war is fought. The idea is sometimes expanded to read kriegsraison geht 
vor kriegsmanier, most closely meaning “the necessity of war overrides the way of fighting a 
war,” and signifies an ideology that is the antithesis of Just War theory.55 The 1904 German 
Military Code for the Conduct of War on Land noted a possible incompatibility between its 
heavily emphasized military necessity and “exaggerated humanitarian ideas.”56 Those 
“humanitarian ideas” would likely vary depending on who was asked; a pacifist such as Tolstoy 
might argue that a war could never be justly fought, while a disciple of Lieber might instead 
offer that a war might be just if fought under certain circumstances. These two ideas hold that 
certain actions cannot be taken within a just war, but a disciple of kriegsraison would argue that 
the morals behind a war are irrelevant so long as the outcome is beneficial to the one waging it.  
The decision made by the German high command, the Oberste Heeresleitung, or OHL, to 
enact the Schlieffen Plan directly violated a treaty to uphold Belgian neutrality that had been 
signed by Germany. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, Chief of Staff and head of the OHL at 
the beginning of the war, likely believed that the tactical advantage projected by the Schlieffen 
Plan far outweighed the political ramifications of attacking a neutral country. The decision to 
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invade Belgium fits perfectly within the framework of kriegsraison, as the OHL sacrificed some 
“humanitarian ideas” for what they deemed a military necessity. Though Germany’s attack 
through Belgium allowed them to circumvent French defences at its border, Germany still faced 
the monumental task of storming through both Belgian and French forces on its march to Paris. 
 
The Slaughter in Belgium and the Beginning of Trench Warfare 
Beginning on August 25, 1914, German troops stationed in Louvain, near Brussels, 
accused the Belgian populace of taking up arms against Germany. German forces destroyed a 
significant portion the town, burning the medieval library and executing approximately 248 
Belgian civilians.57 The Burning of Louvain would soon become one of the most infamous 
episodes in the events that would later be known as the Rape of Belgium. Louvain was quickly 
used by the Allies as propaganda against Germany, however, many in Germany believed the 
Allied claims of German war crimes were unfounded. In October, 1914, prominent German 
scientists, scholars, and artists offered their full support to Germany’s military by drafting and 
signing the Manifesto of the Ninety-Three to rebuke what they believed to be Allied lies.58 Still, 
as political pressure mounted against Germany, its forces pushed across Belgium and into 
France, intending to capture Paris and fulfill its promise that the war would be over before 
Christmas with a German victory.  
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Germany marched through Belgium fairly quickly and delivered several crushing defeats 
to the Allied forces in the early stages of the war. The French, specifically, saw 75,000 killed in 
August, with the worst of the fighting occuring during the Battle of the Frontier, the name given 
to a collection of battles that occured from August 20 to August 24. On August 22 alone, France 
suffered 260,000 casualties, with 27,000 killed, the greatest loss of life on a single day in French 
military history.59 Still, Germany suffered many losses of its own during those months, but 
continued to press forward until the First Battle of the Marne, when an Allied counterattack 
halted their progress on September 6. By September 12, the German army was forced to retreat 
North to the Aisne river where stalemates against the British forced Germany to dig the first 
major trenches of the war, culminating in the famous “race to the sea” and the beginning of 
trench warfare. If either side wished to end the war quickly and with a definitive victory, new 
tactics and technologies would have to be adopted to fight what had settled into a predominantly 
defensive war.  
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Early Chemical Development  
 On October 27, 1914, approximately 3,000 German chemical shells bombarded the 
British lines around Neuve Chapelle in the Artois region of France. The so-called “Ni-shells” 
were standard German fragmentation shells that contained a powdered mix of dianisidine salts 
designed to be irritating to the eyes and lungs.60 The Germans hoped that their Ni-shells would 
be able to force the British soldiers out from houses or other defensible positions, yet the 
chemicals did not produce the desired effect. The German shells proved to be so ineffective that 
Allied intelligence was unaware of their existence until the plans were discovered in German 
documents after the war.61 
 Germany was not the only country to use chemicals in a military form during the first few 
months of the First World War. Prior to the use of Ni-shells, the French used irritating gases 
similar to modern tear gas as early as August, 1914, which marked the first use of gas weapons 
in the war.62 The French cartouches suffocantes were special canisters filled with a highly 
volatile liquid, ethyl bromoacetate, that had been designed and used for domestic crowd control 
before the war by the French Police in 1912.63 France was actually the only major power in the 
war that had a stockpile of gas shells prior to the start of the conflict; many of the other powers 
had very limited chemical research leading into the war.64 The French continued to develop their 
lachrymatory agent, or tear gas, as the war progressed. By February, 1915 French scientists had 
developed hand-held grenade canisters called grenades suffocantes, which contained a higher 
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concentration of the same chemical, though it is unclear whether they were ever used in 
combat.65 
 Unlike France, Germany did not enter into the war ready to use gases in combat. The 
German military had investigated the possible use of gas weapons before August 1914, but the 
research from the prewar trials proved so ineffective that it might have have made Germany 
reluctant to perform additional research during the war.66 German gas research began again in 
the latter half of September 1914, shortly after the replacement of Helmuth von Moltke by Erich 
von Falkenhayn as Chief of Staff. In October, Falkenhayn tasked Max Bauer, then Chief of the 
Heavy Artillery, to assemble a small team of scientists and army officers at the Wahn artillery 
range near Cologne.67 Bauer’s team quickly designed and implemented their “Ni-shells” in a 
single month, which might have been a remarkable feat if the result had not proved such a 
resounding failure.68 After approximately 17,000 more shells were created, the project was 
abandoned by the OHL.69 
 In November 1914, Hans Tappen, a chemist whose brother was an advisor to Falkenhayn, 
advocated to the OHL the use of liquid xylyl bromide in artillery shells.70 Production of the xylyl 
bromide, codenamed “T-Stoff,” began in December 1914 at Bayer and Kahlbaum facilities, and 
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shell filling began in January 1915.71 The T-Stoff shells were first used against the Russians at 
Bolimów in what is now central Poland on January 31, 1915, but, due to the extremely cold 
weather, the xylyl bromide did not vaporize and the shells had negligible impact on the enemy.72 
The Germans tried to compensate for the cold by using a mixture of T-Stoff and B-Stoff, also 
called bromoacetone. In March the combined shells were used against the French at Nieuport, 
and, for the first time, victims of the gas actually noticed something unusual about the German 
shells.73 
 While the initial development of T-Stoff was still underway, Fritz Haber, famous for his 
prewar work on synthetic ammonia, advocated a different substance to the OHL. Haber had been 
present at the initial testing of T-Stoff, and came away unimpressed by the demonstration, 
believing that tear gas would be useless on a small scale.74 His initial idea to correct the issue 
with tear gas was to fire the gas shells from grouped mortars, but the lack of available supplies 
made his scheme impossible.75 Haber’s next idea was to use chlorine released from cylinders, 
which gained much more interest from the OHL. Both the chlorine and the cylinders already 
existed since chlorine was an important reagent in the German dye industry.76 Haber described 
chlorine as a “lung irritant” and claimed that it would work much more effectively than tear gas 
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for clearing out trenches.77 By the end of 1914, Fritz Haber had been promoted from a Non-
Commissioned Officer in the Reserve to the rank of Captain.78 
 
Chlorine at the Front 
[I]t was on the afternoon of my birthday that we noticed volumes of dense yellow smoke 
rising up and coming towards the British trenches. We did not get the full effect of it, but 
what we did was enough for me. It makes the eyes smart and run. I became violently sick, 
but this passed off fairly soon. . . .The next thing I noticed was a horde of Turcos (French 
colonial soldiers) making for our trenches behind the firing line; some were armed, some 
unarmed. The poor devils were absolutely paralysed with fear.  
-L/Cpl J. D. Keddie, Η Coy., 48th Royal Highlanders of Canada.79 
 
 April 22, 1915 began as a warm sunny day at Ypres in Belgium. An innocuous breeze 
blew from the German position in the North to the Allied trenches in the South at the Ypres 
Salient.80 At approximately 5:00 PM, Germans at the Northern end of the salient opened 
canisters of pressurized liquid chlorine, which when exposed to the atmosphere were instantly 
vaporized and propelled towards the Allied position by the wind.81 Some soldiers hit by the gas 
were severely wounded and fell comatose, while others struggled to breathe as the gas flowed 
into their trenches, forcing many soldiers to abandon their posts.82 The Germans quickly 
advanced from their positions at the center of the assault, but their attacks from the sides proved 
to be far less effective.83 German soldiers were cautious of the gas their side had released and 
advanced slowly behind the cloud, hindered mainly by patches of gas that had been left behind in 
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the craters and troughs of the battlefield.84 The Germans concluded April 22 with the capture of 
Langemark and Pilken along with approximately 2,000 prisoners and 51 guns, but by April 23 
the advance once again felt major resistance from the Allies.85 The casualties from the battle are 
disputed, with British estimates showing approximately 5,000 casualties, while the Germans 
initially claimed it caused near 15,000 casualties, and some writers of the time estimated 20,000 
casualties with 5,000 killed.86 
The ideology of Kriegsraison was likely a large contributor to Germany’s decision to use 
chlorine at Ypres. Germany, like most other countries at the time, had planned for the Great War 
not only to be great, but to be short, perhaps even concluded by Christmas, 1914. Germany’s 
strategic resource stockpile reflected their expectation of a short war, and as Christmas passed 
and 1915 arrived, British blockades put Germany in grave danger of running out of supplies that 
could only be found overseas.87 Specifically, Germany needed gunpowder and bombs, both of 
which could be created from their quickly diminishing supply of Chilean nitrates or alternatively, 
as Fritz Haber noted, from nitric acid.88 Haber believed that the ammonia he had helped create 
could be turned into nitric acid, though many at BASF thought large scale manufacturing was not 
possible. Still, BASF, at the behest and funding of the German government and armed with 
knowledge of the potential profitability of nitric acid, undertook the challenge of creating nitric 
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acid from their synthetic ammonia.89 Carl Bosch, who discovered how to upscale Haber’s 
nitrogen work to an industrial level, was chosen by BASF to head the project, but the transition 
from ammonia to nitric acid was excruciatingly slow. Bosch’s progress at the start of 1915 began 
to worry the OHL, who were no longer confident that BASF would be able to produce the nitric 
acid at the required rate to conduct the war, so the high command began to search for a new 
tactic to end the war before Germany’s resources were exhausted.90 Fritz Haber’s idea to use 
Germany’s industrial chlorine promised a solution that would not only result in a new weapon, 
but one that would do so without further draining German resources. While the OHL had decided 
to use chlorine in a desperate attempt to avoid defeat by attrition, the attack ironically proved 
unnecessary. On May 1, 1915, nine days after the chlorine attack at Ypres, Carl Bosch 
announced that BASF’s plant at Oppau was capable of producing nitric acid on a scale necessary 
to supply the war effort.91 
 The Allied response to Ypres was nothing short of scathing. John French, Commander in 
Chief of the British Expeditionary Force said “The enemy just missed colossal success rendered 
possible by the use of an entirely new war method; one contrary to engagements entered into by 
them at the Hague Convention.”92 French was indisputably correct on his first statement; 
Germany had indeed missed a colossal success, but just barely. Some soldiers at Ypres reported 
knowing that the approaching gas was chlorine, and by April 24 the Allies were already 
distributing makeshift gas masks made from rags soaked with water or urine, neither of which 
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would have been an effective counter to a gas such as phosgene.93 To French’s second point, 
Germany had indeed been a signatory of the 1899 and 1904 Hague Conventions, both of which 
placed restrictions on the use of gas and poisonous weapons, but the terms of the agreements 
were vague and nebulous.94  
 Falkenhayn and other leaders at the OHL had not simply ignored German commitments 
under the Hague Convention, but instead skirted negotiators’ intentions by interpreting the 
wording of the document quite literally. For instance, the Hague Conventions restricted the use 
of “projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or delirious gases.” 
German chlorine used at Ypres was not delivered in the form of a projectile; instead, it was 
simply exposed to the air and carried by the wind.95 Similarly, the Hague Conventions restricted 
the use of “poison or poisoned arms,” but the German high command believed that this 
restriction applied to poisoned weapons or the poisoning of a water supply, since asphyxiating 
and delirious gases were already accounted for under an entirely separate restriction.96 Further, 
Germans contended that the early French use of their own projectile-based cartouches 
suffocantes without retribution was a clear indication that the Allies also viewed the Hague 
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Convention in such a narrowly literal interpretation.97 Germany responded to the outcry over 
their chlorine attack at Ypres mainly by comparing the actions of France in 1914 to their own. 
Inside of the instructions for their tear gas, France had informed its soldiers that the cartouches 
suffocantes were not dangerous at the small concentrations that would occur in a trench. In June, 
1915, a German Ministry of War justification for the use of chlorine gas cited those French 
instructions and drew the implication that the tear gas would be lethal in larger concentrations. 
The German riposte to Allied outrage chided, “What hypocrisy when the same people grow 
‘indignant’ because the Germans much later followed them on the path they had pointed out!”98 
  
Escalation of Gas Warfare and the Introduction of Phosgene 
 Shortly after the Second Battle of Ypres, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, 
commander of the German Sixth Army wrote in his journal “I made no secret of the fact that the 
new gas weapons seemed not only disagreeable but also a mistake . . . the enemy would have 
recourse to the same means, and with the prevailing winds he would be able to release gas 
against us ten times more often than we against him.”99 Time soon proved the commander 
correct when, on September 25, 1915, the British conducted a chlorine attack of their own at the 
Battle of Loos, marking the first use of a poisonous chemical weapon by an Allied power in the 
war. The chlorine was delivered by the same method that the Germans had delivered it at Ypres, 
but the British soon began development of a mortar that would be able to fire specially made gas 
shells, though it is unclear if or when they intended to use it.100 The genie was out of the bottle, 
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or perhaps more appropriately, the chlorine was out of the canister, and The Great War had now 
become just as much a war among chemists as it was between generals and monarchs.101 
 Germany took the next step in the escalation of gas warfare with the introduction of 
phosgene into the battlefield. On December 15, 1915, German soldiers discharged 177 tons of a 
mixture of phosgene and chlorine codenamed “D-Stoff” against British troops at Flanders.102 
Though the British were better prepared for a gas attack after Ypres, phosgene is more toxic and 
dense than chlorine, which enabled the gas to more easily sink into trenches. Additionally, 
phosgene does not have an unpleasant smell, and so some soldiers poisoned by the gas did not 
immediately know it. By the end of the attack, the novel gas mixture had caused 1,069 casualties 
including 120 deaths.103 Like chlorine, Germany had a large stockpile of phosgene as early as 
1914 because phosgene was adopted in the 1880’s for use in the manufacture of dyes. This ready 
made supply meant that Germany would not have to expend many resources in order to test and 
use the gas in combat.104  
Though Germany was the first to possess and use phosgene, their introduction of the gas 
into battle that December would haunt them for the remainder of the war. The British had said 
shortly after the Second Battle of Ypres that they would not use any gas weapons that the 
Germans had not already used in combat; with Germany’s use of phosgene in December, the 
Allies now had a sort of “permission” to use another poison gas in the war.105 The French 
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initiated the Allied use of phosgene when they fired shells of the gas at the Battle of Verdun in 
February, 1916, using the mortars that the British had developed shortly after the Battle of 
Loos.106 The British soon followed suit and first used phosgene in June of the same year, just 
before the Battle of the Somme, only a few months after their French allies.107 Phosgene later 
became one of the main gases used by the Allies in World War I, while Germany reduced its use 
in favor of mustard gas. Though it was largely used only by the Allies, and was not the most 
heavily deployed gas in the war, phosgene resulted in the majority of gas related fatalities in 
World War I.108 Verdun also marked the first use of a projectile based poisonous gas weapon, the 
first indisputable violation of the gas provisions within the Hague Convention by any of the 
major powers.109 If Germany and the United Kingdom were able to stay within the bounds of the 
Hague Convention by technicality, after February the same could not be said for the French. 
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The Hague Conference and the War Overseas 
 On July 29, 1899, every major power in attendance at the First Hague Conference, except 
the United States, signed provisions limiting the use of chemical weapons in warfare.110 The 
United States’ representative for the conference was Naval Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who 
refused to sign the provisions on gas weapons on the grounds that he believed they might 
sometimes be humane to use.111 Mahan was the only representative at The Hague Conference 
who declined to sign the gas provision, even though it was not very controversial and produced 
little debate when it was introduced.112  
 Thus, America was not obligated by international commitments against using chemical 
weapons in war, as all the major European powers in World War I were. Still, the United States 
performed very little research and had practically no interest in gas warfare before 1917.113 The 
lack of pre-war research was likely caused by inadequate government funding and a relatively 
unspecialized industrial economy stemming from an isolationist foreign policy. In 1914, Army 
and Navy laboratories were underfunded and were only able to perform light tests on mundane 
equipment such as guns and cannons, leaving no room for investigations into chemical weapon 
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production and usage.114 Similarly, U.S. corporations were far behind Europe, and specifically 
Germany, in terms of both chemistry and specialized manufacturing in 1914. Members of the 
American private sector would have faced major difficulties had any company endeavored to 
perform gas research.115  
The German use of chlorine at Second Battle of Ypres was an incredibly controversial 
topic in Europe. Many countries criticized Germany for violating the Hague Convention, but the   
United States did not number among them. The event was reported in papers across America, but  
virtually no politicians or military leaders made any official statements about it.116 The military 
silence about Ypres was not unexpected, since on August 16, 1914, just after the war began, 
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President Wilson had instructed the both the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy that 
they, and their subordinates, were not to issue any public statements about the war in Europe.117 
America was committed to remaining neutral in the war; not even gas usage on the other side of 
the ocean could arouse concern among many American minds—only an experience that brought 
the conflict directly into American experience could do that. 
 
Weapons Under the Waves 
On May 7, 1915, a German U-boat attacked and sank the RMS Lusitania in international 
waters. Germany claimed the Lusitania was carrying munitions and so its submarine sunk the 
ship without warning, killing approximately 1,200 people, including nearly 130 Americans.118 
Americans were outraged at the German Empire for the attack; many in the United States 
claimed that it was a violation of the Hague agreements because the ship was sunk without 
warning. Some Americans even alleged that the attack was premeditated by Germany.119 The 
American Public did not seem very concerned about the fate of Europe while the effects of war 
occured overseas, but the sinking of the Lusitania symbolized American blood on German hands 
and many in the United States demanded action, though little came of such calls.120  
 Tensions escalated when on March 24, 1916, the German Empire sank the SS Sussex, a 
French ship carrying two Americans. The incident nearly caused the United States to sever 
diplomatic relations with Germany, but tensions eased when Germany restricted its submarine 
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warfare campaign with the Sussex Pledge.121 Matters calmed between Germany and the United 
States until January 31, 1917, when Germany officially wrote to the United States that the 
German Empire would resume their campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. President 
Wilson responded to Germany’s statement by severing diplomatic ties between the United States 
and Germany on February 3, 1917.122  
 The final straw for the United States came when government officials learned about the 
Zimmerman Telegram to Mexico. The secret German diplomatic communication was intercepted 
and decoded by British Intelligence and then forwarded to the United States. The telegram 
indicated that a war with the United States was not Germany’s intention, and that the empire 
would do its best to keep America neutral in the war. The telegram went further to say, however, 
that if a war with the United States could not be avoided, Germany would help Mexico regain 
their lost territories from the treaty of 1848 if Mexico declared war against the United States.123 
The United States then sent a letter to the American embassy in Mexico, requesting the 
Zimmerman Telegram be disclosed to Mexican General Venustiano Carranza.124 Further, the 
American Ambassador to Mexico was told to mention to Carranza “[I]t is probable that the 
contents of this note will be made public in the United States immediately . . . it might be well 
for the Mexican Government to make some comment.”125 
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Declaration of War and American Readiness  
I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German government 
to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United 
States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; 
and that it take immediate steps, not only to put the country in a more thorough state of 
defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the 
government of the German Empire to terms and end the war. 
- President Woodrow Wilson, April 2, 1917126 
 
 The official declaration of war by the United States to Germany came on April 6, 1917, 
four days after President Wilson gave his recommendation to Congress, and only about five 
months after Wilson won reelection with the slogan “He kept us out of the war.” Though 
America had not shown great personal interest in the war while it remained strictly overseas, 
Germany’s submarine warfare campaign allowed the conflict to leach out of Europe until its 
effects on America were too great to ignore. Wilson described the German government as one 
“which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right . . .” while claiming that 
Americans were friends of the German people and the United States only sought the downfall of 
a government “that did what it pleased and told its people nothing.”127 Wilson stated that the 
entry of the United States into the war was purely a selfless action; that America would seek no 
compensation, as its only purpose in the war was for the world to “be made safe for democracy” 
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in the face of “autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by 
their will, not by the will of their people.”128 
The United States had one main advantage upon its entry into the war; the country was 
not yet exhausted from the conflict that had been ravaging the European landscape for the past 
three years. Unfortunately for the United States, its military was entirely unprepared for its entry 
into the Great War “over there,” having only carried out light preparations a few months before 
the declaration of war.129 Prior to America’s entry into the war, the United States military had yet 
to develop even a single gas mask, placing America far behind the European powers in its ability 
to use and defend against modern weapons.130  
Although the United States lagged far behind Europe in terms of gas technologies, the 
American research method was not starting from nothing. The United States Bureau of Mines 
had been assigned the preliminary responsibility for handling the United States’ chemical 
warfare in February, 1917, as the bureau had previous experience from research and 
development of gas masks for use in mining in 1908.131 The Bureau of Mines had not actually 
done anything related specifically to chemical warfare before the conflict reached the America, 
so the United States Council of National Defense formed a Committee on Noxious Gases. On 
April 6, 1917, the very same day Congress declared war on Germany, the committee began its 
research into gas warfare by studying British and French gas literature.132 By the end of July, 
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1917, America had manufactured approximately 20,000 gas masks, all of which were based on 
British designs.133  
Though the Bureau of Mines focused primarily on defenses against gas warfare, 
Americans also investigated the offensive use of gas. Defensive gas research primarily came out 
of university chemical laboratories, and the two main universities at which the United States 
chose to carry out its chemical research were the Catholic University of America in March, 1917, 
and American University in April, 1917. While the two universities were not the only ones to 
perform research, they were the best situated due to their location in Washington D.C., their  
relatively advanced laboratories, and their willingness to help in the war effort.134 By May, 1917, 
the Bureau of Mines had access to 21 universities and their laboratories to help with research, 
along with 15,000 chemists who indicated they would be willing to help in the research of 
chemical weapons in a national survey.135  
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Blisters and Blindness 
 On June 26, 1917, at St. Nazaire in France, the first American soldiers landed in Europe 
and exited their ships to the sounds of cheering as French citizens gathered in crowds to show 
their support for America’s entry into the war. By 1917, France had been battered by World War 
I; its military was exhausted, its countryside was pockmarked with artillery craters, and the 
majority of its territory northeast of Paris was still occupied by German forces. America’s 
declaration of war signaled to the French and British that relief was soon on its way, but the 
small number of troops in that first wave would not be enough to give France or Britain any real 
sense of reprieve. By the time Americans entered the war on any significant scale, French and 
British troops would have already spent years under constant bombardment by the Germans. In 
July, Germany’s chemical weapon developers unleashed what would become the “king of the 
battle gases”: dichlorodiethyl sulfide, more commonly known as mustard gas.136  
 Mustard gas was not a new chemical so much as it was a new weapon. The pungent 
yellow-brown gas was first synthesised in an impure state in Germany, and appeared in scientific 
literature as early as 1860.137 By 1886, German chemist Victor Meyer had synthesised mustard 
gas in its pure state and wrote about its various harmful effects in detail.138 In 1912, Hans 
Thacher Clarke, an English chemist studying in Germany, worked with Meyer to devise a better 
method of producing fairly pure mustard gas that was safer and easier to use than the one Meyer 
had devised 26 years prior.139  
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Despite this basis in established knowledge, research on mustard gas took a back seat to 
chlorine early in the war, and so it was only introduced in the final months of 1917. Fritz Haber 
had considered multiple gases, including mustard gas, as contenders for use at Ypres near the 
beginning of the war, but he settled on using chlorine because of its high toxicity and 
availability.140 Haber specifically rejected mustard gas because he did not believe its toxicity was 
great enough.141 In the modern day, chemical weapons are divided into several subcategories: 
weapons like chlorine and phosgene are known as pulmonary or choking agents, benzyl bromide 
and xylyl bromide would be classed as lachrymators or as lachrymatory agents, and mustard gas 
would be categorized as a vesicant or a blistering agent. Haber focused on the toxicity of mustard 
gas, which is fairly low compared to many other chemical weapons, but ignored the debilitating 
and horribly painful blisters that resulted from mustard gas exposure.  
In 1916, two German scientists who had previously worked with Fritz Haber, Wilhelm 
Steinkopf and Wilhelm Lommel, again proposed the use of mustard gas in war. Laboratory 
studies on the gas in September, 1916, indicated it would fare well in battle, and in the spring of 
1917, Germany began filling a small number of shells at a factory in Adlershof, near Berlin.142 
Shortly after the shell filling began, an accident at Adlershof caused the station to explode, 
destroying all the equipment and gas shells it had manufactured.143 After the explosion, many 
German gas experts were hesitant to use mustard gas, not only because of the explosion, but 
because German gas masks were not effective against it.144 Though the factory explosion clearly 
displayed the hazards of the chemical, it also showed the clear potential mustard gas had as a 
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weapon. Despite the incident, testing on mustard gas continued, and by July, 1917, Germany had 
enough shells to fire 50,000 of them at Ypres.145 
 Shortly before the Battle of Passchendaele, also known as the Third Battle of Ypres, 
Germany fired mustard gas shells at British forces for the first time in the war.146 Germany 
hoped that the gas shells would delay the British, who appeared to be gearing up for a major 
offensive.147 The shelling continued for about two weeks before the full scale battle commenced 
on July 31, 1917, but Germany stopped using the gas during the battle, both due to  a supply 
shortage and because the military was unsure of how effective the gas had actually been.148 Once 
again, German scientists did not seem to understand the military significance of the gas, but the 
consequence of their misunderstanding was not as severe as those created by their blunder with 
chlorine two years prior. At the Second Battle of Ypres, Germany had intended to use chlorine 
offensively to create a breakthrough in the trenches, but the stakes were much lower for mustard 
gas at Passchendaele because the gas was used defensively.149  
German forces at Passchendaele used mustard gas because it had a much longer half life 
than other gases, and its relatively high density compared to air meant the gas would persist on 
the battlefield and linger in the trenches.150 Like Haber, the German forces at Passchendaele did 
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not realize the gas wounded through skin contact, meaning gas masks might have offered slight 
protection to the lungs and eyes, but did little to protect the body. In terms of skin contact, 
soldiers also had very little protection; mustard gas is able to diffuse through clothing; a standard 
uniform did little to prevent the blistering that caused 90% of mustard gas casualties.151  
After the initial shelling at Passchendaele, the British military attempted to hide the 
casualties associated with the vesicant from Germany, hoping that they would not realize the 
demoralizing effect the gas had on British troops.152 Still, Germany was able to learn about the 
effects of the gas through Allied prisoners of war that were affected by it, and by December, 
1917, Germany had created another stockpile of mustard gas shells.153 From December, 1917, to 
March, 1918, Germany intentionally used mustard gas sparingly—not because of a 
misunderstanding of the effects of the gas, but because the German military was learning how to 
best utilize it.154 When Germany began regularly using mustard gas, they deployed it differently 
from the other battle gases. Instead of using mustard gas during battle, German forces would 
launch shells of the gas before their attack, giving time for the gas to dissipate before it could 
affect German troops while also causing early casualties to the Allies.155 From March until June, 
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Germany began regularly incorporating shells of mustard gas into its chemical arsenal, but by 
June’s end, Germany was no longer the only power able to develop and use mustard gas.  
 
Allies Crack the Final Gas 
 The Allies started using mustard gas late in the war because it took significantly longer 
for them to learn how to mass produce the gas than it took Germany. When Germany first used 
the gas in July, 1917, Allied chemists immediately recognized the chemical as dichlorodiethyl 
sulfide, but the Allies did not yet have a good way of producing the gas.156  
 While Germany had little trouble producing mustard gas using the method developed in 
1912 by Clarke and Meyer, British and French chemists were unable to reproduce their results, 
and instead were forced to rely on the more difficult and dangerous method developed by Meyer 
in 1886.157 By the end of August, 1917, Allied chemists had produced only a miniscule amount 
of mustard gas, and even worse, the process required use of ethylene chlorohydrin as an 
intermediate, another dangerous chemical even harder to procure in the Allies’ chemical 
stockpile.158 In September, chemists in the United States began working to create mustard gas, 
but they too suffered the same failures that their allies in Europe had experienced.159 Between 
August and December, the Allied chemists made little progress towards producing mustard gas, 
however, in January, 1918, a British chemist named William Jackson Pope suggested 
substituting the ethylene chlorohydrin with sulphur dichloride, which would help solve the 
supply issue.160 That same month, France and Britain enlisted more chemists to work on the 
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synthesis of mustard gas, and by April, France, Britain, and the United States were able to 
reliably generate the compound, though they all experienced extremely low yields.161 A 
breakthrough finally came when French chemists discovered that the yield could be improved by 
reducing the temperature of the reaction. By the end of April, France was able to produce the 
first reliable and efficient synthesis of Allied mustard gas. About a month later, in May, Britain 
and the United States were also manufacturing substantial quantities of mustard gas.162  
 The French were the first of the Allies to use mustard gas in battle when they fired shells 
at German forces on June 16, 1918.163 The British were second to use the gas, but did so about 3 
months later, on September 18, the opening day of the Battle of St. Quentin Canal near 
Bellicourt in France.164 Germany’s chemical superiority allowed them to first use the gas July, 
1917, about 11 months before any Allied power could respond in kind, but scientific prowess 
alone cannot win a war.  
 In October, 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution forced Russia to end the fighting on the 
Eastern Front, seemingly giving Germany one last chance to defeat the British and French before 
the Americans could arrive in full force. Germany launched its final offensive in Spring, 1918, 
but their last-ditch effort was repulsed by the Allied forces. Soon, American troops arrived en 
masse in Europe, and an Allied counter offensive began pushing the Germans out of France and 
Belgium. Fearing that the fighting could reach German territory, Germany was forced to seek an 
armistice and an end to the war. 
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No Rest for the Wicked  
The armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, at 5:00 AM in France, and was 
scheduled to go into effect at 11:00 AM that same day. An hour before noon, the entire Western 
front fell nearly silent, save the sounds of birds singing in no man’s land.165 While some soldiers 
rejoiced at the end of the fighting, others were too damaged by the war to feel any real sense of 
joy from the announcement. Clifford Lane, a British Corporal in the 1st Battalion, Hertfordshire 
Regiment, recounted in a post war interview:  
Then as far as the armistice itself was concerned, it was an anti-climax. We were too far 
gone, too exhausted, really to enjoy it. All we could do was just go back to our billets; 
there was no cheering, no singing, we had no alcohol – that particular day we had no 
alcohol at all – and we simply celebrated the armistice in silence and thankfulness that it 
was all over. And I believe that happened quite a lot in France.166 
 
Though the armistice ended the fighting, the war did not technically end until the peace treaty 
was signed in 1919.  
 The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, exactly five years after the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand, marked the official end of World War I.167 The treaty imposed 
extremely harsh conditions upon Germany, and demanded that the defeated state accept both 
moral and financial responsibility for the conflict. Further, the treaty stripped Germany of its 
colonies, mandated a reduction in size of its military, and forced Germany to cede portions of its 
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own national territory to France and the newly reformed Poland.168 With respect to chemical 
weapons, the treaty also banned the use, manufacture, and importation of “asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” specifically in 
Germany.169 Britain further proposed an amendment that, in order to ensure German compliance, 
the Allies should take “effective possession of all chemical processes including drawings of 
plants, manufacturing instructions, and reports of research to date used during the war or for the 
production of substances from which such things were or can be made.”170 Woodrow Wilson 
believed the British amendment was both impossible to enforce, as the Allies would have no way 
of knowing if they were given everything Germany had, and he also suspected that the proposal 
had underlying economic motives. Due to American opposition, the amendment did not become 
part of the treaty.171 
 
A Relative “Peace” and the Future of Gas 
 The economic burden of waging a war in itself can be difficult to manage, but Germany’s 
situation became even worse after the fighting ended due to the Treaty of Versailles. The 
financial burden on Germany became impossible to manage, and the early 1920’s saw the 
extreme hyperinflation of German currency, and the complete economic destruction of the 
Weimar Republic, culminating in Germany missing two reparation payments by the end of 
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1922.172 France reacted to the missing payments by sending troops into the Ruhr region of 
Germany in early 1923, an act which provoked the suspension of all reparation payments and a 
campaign of passive resistance against the French.173 All German chemical factories on the 
Rhine defiantly ceased production, inducing French troops to seize and pillage the factories.174 
Carl Bosch was given enough of a warning about the French takeover that he was able to 
transport most of his equipment out of the BASF plants at Oppau and Ludwigshafen and flee to 
Heidelberg in unoccupied Germany. Carl Bosch was tried in absentia by the French for impeding 
the delivery of reparation goods, and he was sentenced to 8 years in prison and fined 150 million 
marks, though he never actually faced those consequences.175  
Though Europe was not completely at peace even after the Treaty of Versailles, with 
relations tense specifically between France and Germany, the continent appeared to be aligning 
on the specific issue of gas weapons. While Europe was still recuperating from the war, the 
League of Nations began an international dialogue on the use of chemical weapons. In May, 
1920, a British representative to the League of Nations suggested that the world should have an 
in depth discussion about the use of chemical weapons in warfare. The representative sent out a 
sort of survey to the other members of the League of Nations, asking four main questions, which 
in essence were: (1) is the use of gas cruel, (2) should the use of gas be limited in the same way 
as conventional weapons, (3) is it possible to limit the use of gas, for instance requiring 
laboratories to report any new chemicals that could be used as weapons, and (4) should this topic 
continue to be discussed within the League of Nations?176 Most countries seemed to be in 
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agreement that chemical weapons were cruel and should be limited, and agreed that the topic 
should be discussed more in depth, but did not necessarily agree that researchers should be 
required to openly disclose their research on gases.177 
 On February 6, 1922, as part of the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments held in 
Washington D.C., representatives from the United States, France, Italy, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom, the victors of World War I, began to negotiate a treaty barring the use of chemical 
weapons. Article V of the treaty prohibited “The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases, and all the analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the 
general opinion of the civilized world and . . . in the Treaties to which a majority of the civilized 
powers are parties,” though the article was not adopted because France had disagreements with 
it.178 Still, the article was brought up later that year at an assembly of the League of Nations, and 
discussion continued on the topic.179  
 In September, 1922, a four-member commission was set up to study the development of 
chemical weapons, and in 1924 released a report written by prominent chemists, biologists, and 
physiologists that discussed the effects of chemical and biological weapons. The report covered 
the effect of the controversial weapons on the environment, the chronic health effects on soldiers, 
and the difficulty in defending against the weapons. Overall, the report advocated for the 
regulation and suppression of both biological and chemical weapons.180 
In 1925, representatives of many countries around the world arrived at Geneva to draft a 
document related specifically to the use of chemical weapons in war. The Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
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Methods of Warfare, which is usually simplified to the Geneva Protocol, was drafted on June 17, 
1925.181 The document was also signed on the same day by 38 countries, including France, 
Britain, the United States, and Germany.182 The Geneva Protocol was designed to prohibit the 
deployment of chemical weapons against other signatories of the protocol, but it did permit the 
use of chemical weapons in response to an enemy chemical weapon attack, and it also allowed 
for the use of gas on countries that had not signed the protocol. Moreover, the protocol did 
nothing to prevent the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons, it only prohibited the 
use of those weapons on fellow signatories.183  
Even though the Geneva Protocol banned the use of chemical weapons between 
signatories, poison gas research and development continued through the interwar period and into 
World War II. Lewisite, an American designed chemical weapon completed near the tail end of 
1918, that was both poisonous and a vesicant, continued to be tested and developed until 1940, 
when Britain unveiled it had created an antidote for the toxin.184 The British Anti-Lewisite, 
sometimes shortened to BAL, and today known as dimercaprol, did not defeat the vesicant 
effects of lewisite, but did negate its toxicity.185 The BAL essentially obsoleted lewisite before it 
could ever be used in combat, and turned the world's attention back to mustard gas. Mustard gas 
itself continued to be researched and perfected during World War II, even though the weapon 
was never used in the conflict.186 
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Overview of Gas Warfare 
By the end of the war, some 125,000 tons of gas had been deployed in battles by both the 
Allied and Central powers. Of that total 125,000 tons, about 100,000 tons (~80%) were 
pulmonary agents, such as chlorine and phosgene, and 12,000 tons (less than 10%) were 
vesicants. Of the nearly 1.3 million casualties, however, pulmonary agents caused about 875,000 
casualties, while the vesicants, which primarily consisted of mustard gas, resulted 
disproportionately in about 400,000 casualties—nearly 33% of the total casualties. In terms of 
material efficiency, pulmonary agents caused about 1 casualty per 230 pounds of gas, while 
vesicants caused about 1 casualty per 60 pounds of gas.187  
After Germany had unleashed its mustard gas against the Allies, the British and French 
militaries sought protective gear that would work against the vesicant. The French had managed 
to design and manufacture some simple protective clothing, which they primarily gave to their 
artillery units, but the British were not impressed by the garments. The British chemical advisors 
did not believe that the severity of injuries obtained at the front from mustard gas warranted the 
purchase or production of protective clothing, and a Canadian chemical advisor even noted that 
some soldiers were purposely exposing their eyes to mustard gas in order to gain some rest in a 
hospital.188 Though mustard gas did cause a fair number of injuries relative to pulmonary agents, 
most of the injuries were minor enough that the soldier would be back to the front fairly soon, 
usually within 46 days.189 In terms of other gases, virtually all of the pulmonary agents used 
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during the war could be blocked by gas masks. By the late stages of the conflict the gases 
actually became more of a nuisance than a threat because the gas masks were effective, but very 
uncomfortable to wear and difficult to see through.190 One soldier recalled a gas attack in a post-
war interview, claiming “it took me all of my willpower not to pull off my mask,” even though 
he understood the risk of major injury or death had he removed the respirator.191 
Unfortunately, while soldiers usually had the proper protective equipment to negate the 
effects of gases, this was not true for civilians. When mustard gas entered the Great War, it did 
not cause many fatalities among soldiers, but killed a fair number of civilians. On the night 
joining July 20 and 21, 1917, Germans at Armentières shelled Allied forces with mustard gas, 
but accidentally injured 675 civilians living nearby, of whom 86 were killed.192 Mustard gas in 
particular was able to settle into the cellars of many houses near battlefields, and considering 
mustard gas could last as long as 2 weeks in a forest, it likely was able to last much longer in a 
low, enclosed basements.193  
 Even though World War II was larger in scale than World War I, none of the military 
combatants used chemical weapons in any of the battlefield situations. Because Hitler had been 
gassed in 1918, he retained a strong personal aversion to the weapon on the battlefield.194 On the 
American side, General George Marshall expressed his opposition to the use of chemical 
weapons against the Japanese because, even though the weapons might have been effective 
during the island hopping campaign, he feared using the weapons would give the Germans an 
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excuse to use them as well. Marshall asked others to remember the soldiers of World War I, who 
in the “cold and mud, under shell and machine gun fire, [were] bombed and gassed.”195  
 Chemical weapons did see some sparse use during the interwar period in the 1930’s, 
especially against civilians. Fascist Italy had used mustard gas in 1935 and 1936 during the 
Second Italo-Abyssinian war with Ethiopia. Both the civilian and military forces were 
unprepared for the vesicant, and by the end of the war, one Soviet estimate showed 15,000 of the 
50,000 Ethiopian casualties were caused by chemical weapons.196 When Japan used chemical 
weapons against China in the mid 1930’s, they defended its use by claiming that China was not 
an advanced civilization, and since Japan had not signed the Geneva Protocol, it should not have 
mattered whether the Chinese were killed by gas or by bullet.197 In both the cases of Japan and 
Italy, chemical weapons were used against people who had no defenses against it—essentially, 
decision makers had concluded that the weapon could only ever be used effectively against an 
already militarily inferior opponent.  
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Just War: Successes and Failures  
This paper began by framing the topic of chemical weapon usage during World War I 
within scope of Just War theories as they were understood at the time. Three perspectives were 
deliberately picked to be irreconcilable with each other; Tolstoy’s pacifism was essentially the 
opposite of Clausewitzian kriegsraison, and Lieber’s philosophy lay in the middle ground 
between the two. The obvious question posed by this framing is: which interpretation would 
prevail? Unfortunately, the answer to that question is not as simple as the question itself.  
 Leo Tolstoy, even before the conference was held, stated his belief that the First Hague 
Convention was already a failure. Tolstoy believed even the act of banning a weapon defeated its 
own purpose, as there would be no reason to ban a weapon nobody expected to be used. Tolstoy 
saw the Hague Conference would fail in its goals long before its provisions were broken during 
World War I, yet his ideology of pacifism was unrealistic. Tolstoy did not believe a war could be 
just, and so his ideology fails spectacularly to describe the military behavior of any power in 
World War I, or really in any war.  
 Understanding the inapplicability of Tolstoy’s views within early 20th century European 
geopolitics, kriegsraison might seem a more viable alternative to understanding the conflict from 
a militaristic point of view. Germany skirted the bounds of the Hague Conventions by releasing 
chlorine in 1915, and by the end of the war, every major power had clearly violated the peace 
conferences they had signed just decades prior. Kriegsraison might also explain why Germany 
invaded neutral Belgium, yet it fails to explain why Germany chose to release its initial gases 
from canisters. Rather than simply firing the gases as projectiles, Germany attempted to remain 
within the technical bounds of the Hague Conference, yet kriegsraison would dictate any 
adherence to a treaty should always come second to a potential military advantage. 
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 Lieber’s philosophy provided a middle ground between kriegsraison and pacifism, yet 
still does not effectively model the decisions made by each power in World War I. Lieber 
believed a war could be fought justly, so long as certain, prearranged restrictions were upheld by 
the combatants. The harsh treatment of Germany under the Treaty of Versailles supports Lieber’s 
theory, as Germany most often violated the agreed upon rules of war first, but that does not mean 
they always violated them first. France, for instance, used tear gases in the Great War before any 
other power and, at the Battle of Verdun, became the first power to launch poison gas projectiles 
during the war. By the end of the war, each power had violated the Hague Conventions, yet none 
of the Allies faced scrutiny for their infractions.  
 Neither side of the conflict conformed to any consistent concept of Just War theory in 
World War I, despite the volume of rhetoric provided by both the Allies and the Central Powers 
in regards to the other’s conduct of the war. Though France and Britain were quick to argue the 
illegality of chlorine usage under the Hague Convention, Britain developed a mortar capable of 
launching gas shells, and France used that mortar to fire gas shells in the first unequivocal and 
direct violation of the gas provisions within the Hague Conventions. Meanwhile, Germany 
attempted to remain within the technical bounds of the Hague Conventions by initially only 
releasing chlorine and phosgene from canisters, yet continued to introduce numerous gases into 
the conflict after Allied leaders claimed any poison gas use was illegal under that very 
agreement. The leaders of each nation in the Great War made decisions based on the nuances of 
each issue, and those nuances would be impossible to capture within the framework of a single 
Just War doctrine. 
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The Legacy of Chemical Weapons 
The War to End All Wars would be widely recognized as an ironic misnomer within two 
decades, but with respect to major powers’ uses of poison gases on battlefields, World War I 
really was a unique event. Since the signing of the armistice, no major power has used chemical 
weapons against any other major power in war, including through all of World War II. Chemical 
weapons are now classed alongside nuclear and biological weapons as weapons of mass 
destruction, or WMDs, yet their scope and destructive capabilities pale by comparison with 
either biological or nuclear arms.  
Compared to chemical weapons, machine guns might have seemed, at the outset, more 
inhumane than poison gas. Though machine guns were generally regarded as more effective in 
combat than chemical weapons, they were also easier to control and had a much lower 
propensity for harming unintentional targets such as civilians. For instance, in 1917, Germany 
proved unable to control its mustard gas attack at Armentières when the gas drifted from the 
battlefield and into a nearby town, accidentally causing hundreds of civilian casualties. In 
essence, poison gases are indiscriminate weapons that target both civilians and soldiers alike, 
while machine guns must be deliberately targeted at civilians for them to be affected. For these 
reasons, high-speed projectile weapons such as machine guns have been adopted by military 
powers around the world and remain a staple of modern warfare even to the present day, owing 
to their effectiveness and controllability, while chemical weapons usually possess neither 
attribute. 
Chemical weapons on a broad scale are virtually useless against modern gas masks, and 
therefore useless against any opponent who is able to outfit soldiers with the proper equipment. 
In World War I, the gases proved difficult to control, with Germany being forced to wait until 
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the wind was in their favor to release chlorine at the Second Battle of Ypres. German 
Commander Rupprecht, Crowned Prince of Bavaria, noted after Ypres that the use of chlorine 
was a mistake; the wind more often blew against German forces than with it, so the gas weapon 
would be more difficult for Germany to use than it would for the Allies. Further, chemical 
weapons are more effective when used by a military that enjoys disproportionate strength over 
their opponent. In such cases, gases compound the casualties and suffering of the soldiers and 
civilians they are used against.  
 
Final Thoughts 
The Great War saw the major powers of Europe throw their full might at each other in a 
mass slaughter that lasted from 1914 to 1918. Chemistry changed from a science based on 
healing and creation into a weapon of death and destruction. Fritz Haber marked the attitude that 
allowed for that perversion of chemistry to take place when he claimed, “During peace time a 
scientist belongs to the World, but during war time he belongs to his country.”198 Albert Einstein, 
a very close friend of Haber, chose not to participate in the slaughter, and condemned the 
perversion of science into a tool of destruction in the Manifesto to the Europeans—even though 
so few scientists signed the document that it was never published.  
Pope Benedict XV was sickened by the loss of life as early as 1914, as he watched his 
fellow Europeans “strive to destroy one another with refinements of horror,” using “the most 
awful weapons modern military science has devised,” not knowing those weapons would soon 
include gases that cause soldiers to drown in their own lungs. Like Leo Tolstoy, Benedict XV 
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called upon all leaders to settle their disputes without violence, though, once hostilities erupted, 
he should have known his calls would be ignored.  
After World War I was over, the world came to the consensus that poison gases are  
inhumane and cruel weapons, and all respected world leaders since then have decided to never 
use them again in conflicts. Unfortunately, the decision to ban chemical weapons was only made 
in 1926, after hundreds of thousands of people, both soldiers and civilians, were killed by them.  
World War I serves as an example of the evil that can occur when science ceases to serve 
humanity and instead serves the whims of one’s nation. Scientific progress can present both good 
and evil potential, regardless of circumstances. Fritz Haber, for all he did wrong in his life, still 
created one of the most important chemical processes in history. The Haber-Bosch process, 
which produced chemicals that were used to kill hundreds of thousands of people in World War 
I, has since allowed the world to feed at least 2 billion more people than it otherwise could 
have.199 Carl Bosch exemplified this sentiment best in 1932, when, in regards to the Haber-
Bosch process, he stated: 
I have often asked myself whether it would have been better if we had not succeeded. 
The war perhaps would have ended sooner with less misery and on better terms. 
Gentlemen, these questions are all useless. Progress in science and technology cannot be 
stopped. They are in many respects akin to art. One can persuade the one to halt as little 
as the others. They drive the people who are born for them to activity.200  
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Uncovering of WPI’s Wartime History 
 Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) is one of the oldest engineering and technology 
universities of the United States, founded in 1865 and situated in Worcester, Massachusetts. As 
students attending WPI, we learned during freshman orientation that the campus had a long 
history of innovators and engineers, such as Robert H. Goddard, Elwood Haynes, and R. Sanford 
Riley. During our research on the impact of the Great War on home front in the United States, 
we were reminded of the metal plaque on campus hanging on Boynton Hall, which was a 
memorial to honor students who lost their lives during the Great War. Inspired by the monument, 
we decided to visit the Gordon Library Archives, which holds many newspapers, journals, and 
books dating back to the founding of WPI, in order to learn more about the campus perspective 
and WPI’s wartime atmosphere. Through researching in the archives we discovered an 
interesting story of WPI’s past, which we believed was worthy of having its own section in this 
paper. The story we uncovered fits well with the themes and ideas presented in our paper, and it 
allowed us to make personal connections to events that occurred more than a century ago.  
 
The Outbreak of War 
 War erupted in Europe on August 4, 1914, and many professors at Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute were overseas when it did. The outbreak of war had put some of those professors in a 
precarious position; they were not specifically barred from leaving Europe, but they were not 
necessarily safe crossing a war zone either. Doctor A. Wilmer Duff, a physics professor, was in 
Germany when the war broke out, and he was able to see Germany’s wartime preparation before 
returning home via a  “very indirect route”.201  Dr. O. W. Long and Dr. Masius, Professors of 
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Modern Languages and Head of the Physics Department, respectively, also managed to return 
safely from Germany, noting their excellent treatment by the German people.202 Additionally, 
Dr. Ewell, Professor of Physics, and his wife were in England when the war began, and were 
able to see the wartime excitement from “various phases”.203 Fortunately, the Institute did not 
lose any professors or students to the initial wartime hostilities.204 
 Many WPI alumni reported various personal difficulties and adventures brought forth by 
the war. One former student, Billy Buzzell, was in Germany when war began, and he recalled 
hiking across Belgium to escape from Germany. Buzzell escaped, partially by train and partially 
by foot, all the while trundling a wheelbarrow behind him containing all of his belongings.205 
Another former student, Chet Inman, was traveling in Switzerland when war broke out. 
Following a long and uncertain journey by train to Naples, Inman returned to the United States 
by boat, but not before experiencing seventeen days of the worst food he ever fathomed.206 For 
some alumni, such as Chadwick, who at the time was employed by a Canadian company, the war 
was very damaging economically. For others, such as Jim Cunningham, a member of the US 
Artillery and Commissary Service, the war helped boom business.207  
Some alumni were partisan towards the German cause. John E. Case, who had lived in 
Dresden Germany for many years, wrote to the Journal of WPI that he believed ultimate German 
victory was certain. Case did not go into great detail describing what he heard, for fear of 
censorship, but he did write,“German war is being conducted on the most merciful principles be 
the Kaiser's troops but the reports of great cruelties on the part of the Allies are continually 
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reaching Dresden and the people there cannot understand how civilized people can do the things 
reported of the French and English.”208 
 WPI’s campus curriculum, attendance rate, and campus activity did not significantly 
change with the outbreak of the war in Europe. There were no immediate calls for students to 
enlist in the military reserve, nor were there calls for students to conduct research for the war 
effort. While there were some alumni who expressed their opinions on the war in the Journal of 
WPI, the campus, like much of the United States, referred to the conflict as the European War.209 
The campus behavior until early 1915 was consistent with President Wilson’s goals, who 
believed that the United States should continue its policy of isolationism, which caused an 
underfunding of military research and resulted in an unusually small army relative to the other 
major powers in the world.210  
 Although the United States was separated from the conflict in Europe by an ocean, many 
citizens and prominent figures, such as Former President Theodore Roosevelt and Major General 
Leonard Wood, pushed  the United States to prepare its military for war.211 Those figures 
believed the United States would not be able to turn a blind eye to the war forever, and after the 
sinking of the RMS Lusitania on May 7, 1915, along with the German atrocities in Belgium, as 
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described in British propaganda, more Americans began discussing the merit of preparing for 
war. . On June 9, 1915, WPI held a banquet surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of the founding 
of the institute and the American Civil War. President of WPI, Ira N. Hollis, who served in the 
Navy for 15 years, invited various people to speak at the event, including President Wilson. 
Unfortunately, President Wilson was unable to attend due matters surrounding the sinking of the 
Lusitania.212 However, Major General Leonard Wood was able to make it to the banquet, where 
he indicated his belief that the United States should invest in a stronger military in case of war 
and in assurance of peace. Major Wood indicated he was doing everything he could to introduce 
military training at colleges and schools, including starting rifle shooting in public schools.213 
Additionally, Ira N. Hollis spoke about how she believed war undoubtedly assisted material 
progress and “may give rise to a nation a new birth into greater freedom and higher moral 
purpose”, citing the United States Civil War.214 In the banquet, Arthur D. Little, a prominent 
chemist at the time, discussed how he believed the United states was lagging behind the rest of 
the world in certain areas, and further argued  the United States was humiliatingly dependent on 
German chemical product imports. Still, Little remained optimistic towards future American 
chemical preeminence.215 
 In late 1915, with great uncertainty surrounding the war and the campus, WPI President 
Hollis made it clear that it was his duty to ensure the campus was prepared for the worst. In 
1915, President Hollis often discussed the role young, trained engineers played in wartime 
preparedness, as well as how war could be forced upon them.216 Additionally, President Hollis 
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invited General Wood to speak to WPI students at an event planned for November 13, 1915. 
General Wood spoke to the students about the preparedness movement, each citizens’ duty to his 
or her country in time of war, and the inadequacy of a regular army to protect the country, 
specifically noting the importance of trained men for officers. President Hollis excused all 
seniors, juniors, and sophomores from their classes to attend General Hollis’ speech, and the 
Atwater Kent building was filled to maximum capacity. Afterwards, the freshmen class also had 
their own individual session with the General.217 President Hollis also preached military 
preparedness off campus. On November 19 he, along with President Maclauren of MIT, spoke in 
front of an audience of 2000 people at Mechanics Hall in Worcester, Massachusetts, 
emphasizing the necessity for a stronger national defense and urging public officials and 
congressmen to realize the inadequacy of the United States armed forces.218 As a result of 
national propaganda for preparedness, on December 3, 1915, more than 250 Worcester business 
men, including WPI professors A. W. Ewell and A. D. Butterfield, met in the State Armory to 
organize a course of study for a Worcester Military Training School.219 
 The war also brought about many new technologies, which made their way into the 
lectures and discussions around campus. In May, 1915, WPI published an article about new 
submarine technologies in the “European War”.220 On November 23, 1915, the campus held a 
lecture discussing how crippled soldiers could still be useful. The lecture was given by an 
engineer that spent the previous fifteen months in German trenches studying the wounded 
soldiers.221 An article in March, 1916, was published in the Journal discussing the role of 
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chemistry in the war, and included questions as to how Germany was  obtaining its nitrogen, 
given the country was being blockaded by the British.222 In October, 1916, Professor Jennings, 
Director of the Department of Chemistry, discussed the impetus of Chemistry in America in 
regards to the war in Europe at a WPI Chemical Club meeting.223 
 By the start of 1916, students were beginning to be called forth to enter into military 
training. In March, nearly all WPI students received a prospectus and a enrollment blank from 
the War Department, inviting them to attend a training camp that would allow each student to 
combine technical education with military training to be of value in time of necessity.224 In 
May,1916, President Hollis introduced and encouraged students to take a new class, titled 
“PHYSICAL EXERCISES AND MILITARY DRILL AT THE INSTITUTE”, noting it was 
necessary to “mark a departure from the old order at the Institute”.225 President Hollis believed 
that such schools as WPI were necessary to form a “natural supplement to West Point” during 
the possible emergence of war, and believed that military science and drill courses for students 
were necessary to fill in “the skeletal organization of officers for active service”226. In November 
28, 1916, Former President William Howard Taft came to WPI to speak of “The League to 
Enforce Peace”227. Still, even with all of the talk of war on campus, the attendance rates for 1915 
and 1916 were rather ordinary. 228 
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 Although President Wilson campaigned with promises of peace and neutrality, he began 
to give way to some sentiments of the war preparedness movement. September 20th, 1916, 
marked the first meeting of the National Research Council of the United States. Founded by 
President Wilson to organize and catalogue all of the available resources and scientists, the 
council was designed to utilize  “the employment of scientific methods in strengthening the 
national defense, and such other applications of science as will promote the national security and 
welfare.”229 The research council membership was to consist of government officials, various 
military branches, private research laboratories, and universities, though the council would not 
actually begin any research until after the United States entered World War I.230  
 Tech students were often persuaded into taking part in the war effort and joining the 
Army and the Navy, but were generally dissuaded from joining as a standard combatant. In 
February 26 of 1917, President Hollis held a speech in the WPI gymnasium, where he explained 
that most technically trained men would find their greatest usefulness outside the actual firing 
line. Nevertheless, President Hollis noted that no attempt should be made to deter men with an 
especial aptitude for military work from enlisting in the regular army.231 Another preparedness 
article on  March 13, 1917, called for all WPI students to fill out blanks with information of all 
specialized training qualifications, such that, in the case war, students could contribute in the 
most effective way. Additionally, the article discussed how West Point cadets would not be 
called until the very last extremity in the war, just how Germany did not enlist undergraduates, 
and learning from the mistake England made by sending men with special qualifications 
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indiscriminately to the battle lines.232 A lecture presented on March 28, 1917, by an Army 
Officer discussed the duties of the numerous departments of the army, and how it was necessary 
for the army to develop electrical and mechanical devices and to perfect existing devices. About 
three hundred students and members of the faculty attended the lecture.  
 
WPI Enters the “European War” 
 On April 11, 1917, Military drills started off with a bang. Of the one hundred and fifty 
men who showed up to the first campus drill, Drill Master Lieut. L. W. Russell started picking 
his on-campus officers for the Freshman and Sophomore companies. Additionally, President 
Hollis spoke to the members of the Senior class on April 9th about ways they might best serve 
their country.  Nearly half of the seniors signaled their intention to take the examination required 
for the position of Second Lieutenant in United States Army. President Hollis told the Seniors 
who wanted to go directly into industrial work that they should go into manufacture of munitions 
or to an engineering branch in the army, but urged all underclassmen to stay with their studies. 
Technically trained men would be in great demand in the near future, and Hollis believed 
underclassmen would best serve if they completed their studies before heading to the military.233 
President Hollis himself assumed some additional responsibilities; he was “named by Secretary 
of War Newton D Baker as one of a board of six men to study coast defense fortifications on call 
of the President of the Army War College in Washington President Hollis went to Washington 
April 25 in this service”.234 
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 As the United States entered the war, so too did it enter an arms race, and both required 
the organization of all its scientists and resources. The Tech News of WPI for April 26 discussed 
the chemists usefulness in the time of war, noting each chemist was vital to creating explosives, 
and manufacturing medications, as well as basic research. The American Chemical Society asked 
each member to give their qualifications and urged every chemist not already part of the society 
to fill out a blank and return it to the Bureau of Mines.235 The National Research Council was 
also put into full swing and was enabled to coordinate research efforts across the United States. 
On May 8th, in response to the request of the NRC, President Hollis appointed a research 
committee at WPI, to whom the National Research Council could assign problems once the 
organization was perfected. The organization of the committee was referred to the Executive 
Committee of the Worcester Chapter of the Society of Sigma Xi, who generated a complete 
index of facilities and specialized professors available on campus. The NRC performed similar 
cataloging of all educational institutions and industrial laboratories in and about Worcester.236  
 In April through May, 1917, a committee simply called “The Committee”, which 
consisted of WPI faculty, voted on matters regarding how WPI could best contribute to the war. 
The committee considered the solutions such as the early closing of the Institute and the 
excusing of students from Institute work that they may enter national-defense service, but 
resolved that the Institute was a school of engineering, and its courses were no less important in 
times of war than in peace. Additionally, the Committee determined, while some students felt as 
though it was their duty to enlist in the Army or Navy, or to take part in the manufacturing of 
munitions, the freshmen, sophomores, and juniors could best serve by remaining at the institute, 
stating “this is by far the most effective kind of national and patriotic service that the great 
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majority of these students can now perform”.237 Specifically, The Council believed that seniors 
were more experienced in engineering than over  99% of men of their age, and should stay in the 
United States to perform those engineering related tasks.238  
 After the introduction of war, many students left for war service, and clubs such as the  
Southwestern Society of Engineers were missing about 20% of their membership by October, 
1917.239 In December,1917, WPI tabulated the grades of all students from 1908-1917, and every 
student of military age whose grade was above 76.2%, or the top third of students, was given 
deferred classification on enlistment in the Engineering Reserve Corps until they graduated from 
the institute.240 There was also an increase in the anti-German sentiments towards the end of the 
war, with one student writing in May, 1918, that conflict was “indeed a righteous war” and 
another in July, 1918, stated “I brand Germany as having repeatedly and broken every existing  
law of God or man”.241 The war caused the original two term year of the school to be changed  
into a three term schedule, under the direction of the War department.242 The war also drastically 
impacted the attendance rate of the campus.  In 1914, there the Institute held approximately 541 
students, but by  January, 1918, only 418, of whom only 115 were not connected to the army or 
navy, remained, falling again in September to 352 students.243 Of the 63 students that graduated 
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in June 1918, only 15 were not in direct service to the Government or working towards military 
and naval preparedness as chemists or munitions and ship manufacturing.244  
By January 1918, many of WPI’s professors and alumni were relocated, in accordance of  
the needs of the research needs of the United States, and many soon resided in Washington,  
where the most secret and classified research was being performed.245 WPI faculty and alumni  
studied technologies such as submarine detectors, guns, poison gas manufacturing, and  
unspecified forms of naval research. As the war progressed, a greater number of professors were  
moved from campus to assist the government, and ultimately, 8 were posted out of campus.246  
Additionally there were some professors assisting the research and manufacturing needs 
of the war on campus, and many of the student facilities were transformed to better aid the war 
effort. In June, 1918, President Hollis spoke at the Forty-Fifth Annual Dinner noting that “He 
also stated that the Washburn Shops have done some the most important war work in the whole 
country.”247 
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In regards to Chemical Warfare  
The usage and research of poisonous and asphyxiating gases were not a common topic of 
discourse on campus, but many WPI chemists contributed in their own ways.248 The most 
notable of the WPI chemists working on poison gas was Professor Walter L. Jennings. 
Walter Louis Jennings received his Ph.D. of chemistry at Harvard University in 
1892.249After attaining his Ph.D, Dr. Jennings went to Germany for additional “post post 
graduate” work at the University of Berlin in 1893, where he studied alongside famed chemists 
Victor Meyer at Heidelberg and Emil Fischer at Berlin. Another chemist, Emil Discher, was so 
impressed by Dr. Jennings, that he invited Jennings to become an assistant at his own private 
laboratory.250 Dr. Jennings was very well esteemed by many Germans in Heidelberg and Berlin, 
as Jennings amazed them with his tennis skills. The initials W. L. J. were carved on many tennis 
rackets and prize loving cups in Heidelberg and Dr. Jennings even found his wife there.251  
After completed his studies in Germany in 1894, Dr. Jennings found himself in London, 
where he was approached by the then-director of the Department of Chemistry at WPI, Leonard 
P. Kinnicutt. Kinnicutt offered Jennings a job at WPI as a professor of organic chemistry, in 
place of George D. Moore, who was retiring.252 Jennings enthusiastically accepted the offer, and 
served as an assistant professor at WPI from 1894-1900, professor from 1900-1937, and was 
eventually appointed Director of the Department of Chemistry in 1911, following Kinnicutt’s 
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death. Throughout his years at WPI, Jennings was a well-regarded and very involved professor 
who participated as a member in many organizations.253  
 Upon the American introduction into the Great War, Jennings was assigned by the 
National Research Council and the Bureau of Mines to perform research on gases as part of the 
Offence Chemical Research Division as a director of the Chemical Warfare Service, with student 
Walton B Scott as his assistant.254 Jennings was reportedly performing intense organic research 
which kept the “home fires” burning in the Salisbury laboratories around the clock.255 Professor 
Jennings’ largest published contribution to the war effort was finding an improved method of 
preparing cyanogen chloride, an extremely poisonous gas.  It is unclear when, during the war, he 
discovered the technique, but it was published in the American Chemical Society Journal in 
1919.256 Professor Jennings’s contributions was said to have made invaluable contributions to the 
Allied Cause and brought great pride to the school.257 
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Following the conclusion to the war, Professor Jennings continued with his research and 
teaching on the WPI campus until 1937, and passed away in 1944 in Bangor, Maine.258 
  
Aftermath - Mixed Feelings 
Interestingly, Jennings, even with his connections to Germany, still researched gases he 
understood would be used against Germans in combat. Jennings is likely a prime example of the 
change in perspective brought about by the war, while the wartime campus activity at WPI 
additionally presents a solid representation of the feelings on the war between 1914 and 1918. 
The campus also highlights the effect on the preparedness movements, transformation of similar 
college campuses, and the willingness of American scientists to research poisonous gases to aid 
the war effort.  
By the time the war had ended, WPI had essentially been transformed into a War 
College; nearly all of the students had gone through military training, and many had served in the 
Army and Military.259 WPI was taken over by the Department of War and transformed from a 
                                               
258 Jennings was also one of the people responsible for reviewing renowned chemist Emil Fischer’s autobiography. 
JENNINGS, Walter Louis. Biography from the WPI Archives, 1944, A17903 426009. Many other students and 
alumni of the WPI campus also significantly contributed to the war effort in various ways. Alumni CF Vaughn 
reported to be involved in the building and operating of a poison gas plant, although the kind of gas and location of 
the plant was kept secret. The Journal 21, 335. Kirtland Marsh who has for several months been in the National 
Army at Camp Devens has just been detailed for special study of gases to be used to neutralize gas attacks by the 
Huns. Ibid, 86-87. Alumni “Phosphine” Walker worked as a chemist on Gas Defense work making masks. Ibid, 269. 
“Mr Green told about The Chlorine Plant at the Edgewood Arsenal the SM Green Co of Springfield designed the 
plant and supervised its construction and operation for the Government. A large number of lantern slides were 
shown as made from official photographs taken by the Chemical Warfare Service of the US Army. The views 
ranged from airplane photos of the entire Arsenal to detail drawings of the chlorine cell employed all exceedingly 
interesting. The chlorine manufactured here was used as the base for the toxic gases mustard, phosgene, chloropicrin 
etc compounded by the Chemical Warfare Service for loading gas shells. This chlorine plant had a daily capacity of 
100 tons of gas about 19 times the capacity of all of the British French and German gas plants combined the plant 
was completed in record breaking time ahead of contract schedule and is an achievement in which WPI men may 
take great pride” The Journal 22, 283.  
 
259 The Journal 22, 1. 
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school of engineering to a school for military engineers.260 Following the conclusion of the war, 
although they were restricted to eleven hours a week and would never conflict with Academic 
exercises, military instructions were still being prescribed until the end of the school year.261 
Most of the professors returned to campus shortly after the war, as did a large number of students 
in the navy and army who wished to continue their studies, many returning as as First 
Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, or, in the case of Arthur D. Butterfield, as a Lieutenant 
Colonel.262 
 The immediate aftermath of the war left many from WPI feeling discontent, as they felt 
their involvement in the war had seriously disrupted campus life without rendering significant 
benefit to the war effort. President Hollis did not feel as though the militarization of the campus 
was particularly useful given how short United States involvement in the war was. In an address 
to the WPI club in Philadelphia in March, 1919, President Hollis summarized the student 
military service on campus:  
So far as we were concerned I do not think it was a success. There was so much 
correspondence on the subject and so many orders issued that we did not know exactly 
where we stood. Furthermore, the interferences by the War Department extended at first 
into everything, and we could not carry on instruction seriously. It grew to be a habit on 
the part of the students to say that this was a military camp and not an educational 
institution. Instinctively the students were thus entirely in the right: this plan of training 
students for the army was not for the benefit of education or for the relief of the colleges; 
it was an emergency measure for the training of officers. When one stops to think of the 
enormous demand for efficient officers in the armies crossing to France it is easy to see 
why the Committee on Education could not think of the benefit to colleges so much as of 
the benefit to the army. I should call the whole plan a failure both from the academic 
point of view and from the military point of view, but it must be kept in mind that we do 
not know how great a success it might have been if the war had lasted."263 
 
                                               
260 Letter from Ira Hollis, the president of WPI to the principal of Dover High School, November 20, 1918, A17903 
425998. 
261 The Journal 22, 22. 
262 Ibid, 48, 244-246, 370-393.  
263 Ibid, 208-228.  
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The student body also took a hit, as there were only forty-four in the graduating class of 1919.264 
There were more than seventeen men from WPI who died in service to their country, of whom 
four were killed in action or died of wounds.265 WPI had performed great research and exhibited 
strong patriotism and unification of the campus at times of war, yet the war was not a net 
positive for WPI; the fragmentation of the campus and the loss of students to the war left a 
bittersweet atmosphere around the school. Still, demobilization orders were soon issued by the 
War Department in December, 1918, and WPI honored the sacrifices of its students with a 
plaque that to this day can be found on the exterior wall of Boynton Hall.266  
                                               
264 The Journal 22, 366. The amount of graduates in the previous years are 63 in 1918, 89 in 1917, 80 in 1916, and 
93 in 1915. Ibid. 
265 Physical Education instructor Frank Christopher Brough was wounded in a battle in France and consequently 
died on July 23, 1918. Ibid, 58. David Mijamin Gaskill, president of the class of 1918, died in Brest, France, on 
October 7, 1918 of pneumonia. Ibid, 87. Arthur Greenwood, alumni of the class of 1909, died of pneumonia 
followed by influenza on November 12, 1918. Ibid, 74. Sergeant Robert Horner Hogg, alumni of the class of 1910, 
was killed in action on March 10, 1918. Ibid, 251. Earl Hamilton Karcher, of the class of 1917, died on March 26, 
1918 from blood poisoning. Ibid, 311-312. Almon Kemp Lincoln, president of the class of 1920, died in an airplane 
accident on December 3, 1918. Ibid, 175-176, 262. Thomas Michael Lynch, alumni of the class of 1908, died at his 
home in Washington D. C. on December 19, 1918. Ibid, 186. John Edward Malone, alumni of the class of 1906, 
died on October 16, 1918 from influenza. Ibid, 247, 186. Raymond Bardwell Penniman, alumni of the class of 1915, 
was reported missing on October, 1916, where in fighting alongside the Royal Canadian Regiment about Ypres, he 
was one of the volunteers selected to lead a movement. None of the officers or men from his company returned. 
Ibid, 125-126. Albert Randolph Prouty, alumni of the class of 1914 and Graduate Assistant in the Electrical 
Engineering Department at WPI, died due to pneumonia on November 18, 1918. Ibid, 78. Winfield Mills Putnam, 
alumni of the class of 1917, died as a Captain of Artillery from wounds on October 20, 1918. Ibid, 312. Bruce 
Errington Stephens, of the class of 1922, died on November 10, 1918 from influenza. Ibid, 63. Louis Dominic 
Tomasi, of the class of 1918, died in January, 1918 from influenza. Ibid, 313. Anson Moulthrop Vibbert, alumni of 
the class of 1913, died on October 23, 1918 from pneumonia. Ibid, 77. Leon Hubbert Webber, alumni of the class of 
1913, died on January 13, 1918 from pneumonia. Ibid, 189. 
266 The Journal 22, 22. Between December 10th and 21st all the army men were given discharges. The Tech News 
10, no. 1(1919).  
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Origins of the Exhibit 
 Most IQPs at WPI are based around the exploration of modern technology, and people 
often travel to different places around the world for their projects. While our group was trying to 
figure out the basis of our IQP, we looked at what each of our interests were and found that we 
all enjoyed history. Two of our group members were particularly interested in the First World 
War, with one member even having a collection of artifacts from the time period, while the other 
two members admitted to not knowing very much about that particular era in history. During one 
weekend we all got together to see some of the artifacts that one of our group members had 
acquired, and this helped kindle the interest of the two group members who had not known much 
about the Great War.  
 We determined that all of us were interested in studying the technological advancement 
during the First World War and began searching for a professor who would be interested in 
advising our project. We specifically began looking for an advisor within the history department 
since our IQP idea was somewhat unorthodox in that it focused almost entirely on the history of 
a technology rather than the technology itself. Eventually, we found an advisor who was 
interested in our topic and able to advise us, and he mentioned early on in the process that the 
IQP could also include an interactive aspect rather than being solely a written piece. After 
playfully jabbing at our group member for having such a large World War I collection, our 
advisor suggested that setting up an exhibit at WPI might actually be a valuable part of our 
project. After discussing the idea amongst ourselves, our group decided that hosting an exhibit 
around the 100th anniversary of Armistice Day would be an appropriate way to showcase what is 
often an overlooked part of world history in the United States. 
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Creating the Exhibit 
 Before we could begin planning what we wanted to bring to the exhibit, we had to 
determine a time and place for the exhibit to be hosted. There were two main candidates that our 
group proposed, which were the Campus Center and the Gordon Library due to the number of 
people that regularly visited both. After some brief discussion, our group decided that the library 
would be the most ideal location because there would be more space and it would be quieter.  
 We worked with the library staff to determine where and when we would be able to host 
the exhibit. We wanted to get the date of our exhibit to be as close to November 11, the date of 
the Armistice, as possible. Unfortunately, the 11th fell on a Sunday and we did not believe that 
many people would show up to the library on the weekend, so we opted instead to have a two 
day exhibit that would be held on the Friday before the 11th and the Monday afterwords. We 
also decided that we would have two different sections for our exhibit. The first would be a 
teaser section that would be put up at the front of the library behind a locked display case for a 
few weeks before the main exhibit. The second part would be held on the third floor of the 
library and would be set up on the two chosen days between noon and 6:00 PM each of those 
days.  
 Once we had the location and dates for our main exhibit, we worked with the Academic 
Technology Center (ATC) to create two advertisement posters for the exhibit that were planned 
to be placed in the library shortly before the start of each event day. The posters were finished 
before the start of the exhibit and locations for them to be placed were worked out with the 
library prior to the commencement of the events.  
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Creating a Survey 
  As we were planning our exhibit, our advisor recommended that we use the unique 
opportunity to collect some information on the modern perception of the combat in the Great 
War. We worked with our advisor to create a short survey that could best address the information 
we were hoping to find. The survey was split into two parts, with the main aspect being based on 
the weaponry of the war, and the second part being based on the exhibit we were hosting. The 
first part of the survey limited responses to checkboxes or numbering in order to keep the interest 
of visitors to the exhibit. The second part of the survey was more open-ended since people would 
likely have different experiences and interests and would learn different things from the exhibit.  
The main aspect of the survey focused on the different forms of weaponry from the First 
World War and was designed to be filled out before seeing the exhibit. Our group began creating 
a survey based around the morality and efficacy of different weapons, but decided to include 
other forms of weapons that were not necessarily unique to or iconic to World War I. The other 
forms of weapons were included in the survey because their effects and dangers are known well 
enough today. For instance, nuclear weapons were not developed until the Second World War, 
but the people answering the survey would know about them and their dangers, and might 
compare those weapons to ones that were available in the First World War. By including modern 
weapons in the survey, any modern bias can be accounted for. A different question asked about 
the controversiality of certain weapons at the time they were used, and only described weapons 
that were available at the time of the First World War. The reason we designed a question around 
the controversy of different weapons was to determine how people today believe people in the 
past reacted to new weapons. The reaction to new weaponry would have been a unique 
experience to World War I, as it saw the first major uses of trenches, flamethrowers, chemical 
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weapons, tanks, and aircraft, and we believed understanding the differences between the modern 
and historical viewpoint might be important in our investigation. Two other “yes” or “no” 
questions were asked as well: “Do you think war can be justified” and “In war, do the ends 
justify the means?” The purpose of the “yes” or “no” questions was to help us decide later 
whether or not the survey responder was a pacifist, as we believed that would greatly influence 
the results of the questions on weapon morality.  
The second part of the survey was based around the exhibit itself and was designed to be 
filled out after viewing the exhibit. The survey asked viewers what they enjoyed most about the 
exhibit and something they learned from the exhibit. These questions were designed to be short 
and easy to answer, but were not designed for any hard evidence to be gathered from them. 
Instead, the two end questions were made to help guide us in our investigation by outlining the 
areas that people did not know much about.  
 Once the survey was completed, we had to get approval from the Institutional Review 
Board, or IRB, before the survey could be used to gather any data. We were not very worried 
about the survey being rejected or about needing to revise it because it did not contain or request 
any personal information, and after a few weeks the survey was approved for use in our exhibit.  
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Teaser Case 
 
Figure III.1: The teaser case display including all of the artifacts we used to advertise for the 
WWI: The Centenary Exhibit. 
 
 When choosing items that would go in the front display case, we decided to include eye 
catching and interesting artifacts so that people walking in to the library would stop and notice 
them. The most eye catching artifact we had was the “Beat Back the Hun” poster. Although it 
was not the most well known poster that could have been used, it was incredibly colorful and eye 
catching. The poster was chosen to be tilted towards the front doors so that people entering the 
library would be directly facing the poster, and so that the poster could be seen from outside the 
library. The next item that was chosen was the Purple Heart. The Purple Heart is an item that 
almost anybody could recognize, making it ideal for the teaser case. As our exhibit was for the 
centennial anniversary of the armistice, we thought it would be appropriate to include a 
newspaper from the day of the armistice in order to remind people that the anniversary is coming 
up, and is the reason for our exhibit. 
 Another way that we tried to get people interested in our display case was by including 
some 3D items. For that reason we decided to include a U.S. artillery shell and a U.S. 101st 
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Infantry helmet. A German Ledermaske was also included as our IQP was largely centered 
around chemical warfare. The last item we decided to put in the display was a British soldier’s 
diary, as it was small and one of the more interesting items that we had access to as the soldier 
was wounded in action July 1st, 1916, the first day of the Somme Offensive. After the items 
were chosen, we wrote descriptions for the items so that people looking at the display could learn 
more about what they were looking at. 
 While the display case was up, we noticed that almost everyone entering the library at 
least looked at the display, and we saw many people stop and read the descriptions of the items. 
Although we could not get survey results from this part of the exhibit, it was a huge success 
because of the large amount of people who were seeing the display. One of the librarians even 
told us that during one of her meetings she was complimented on the fact that there was a display 
for the centennial and how nice it was, and she told them that it was not the library who set it up, 
but instead an IQP team. 
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Main Exhibit 
 
Figure III.2: The main exhibit including all artifacts for the WWI: The Centenary Exhibit. 
 
 When selecting items for the main exhibit we wanted to provide as complete a picture of 
the First World War as we could to our audience. In order to accomplish this, we selected 
artifacts of various origin, size and significance. For example, we chose to bring American, 
French and German tunics and helmets to represent the different colors and styles of tunics three 
different countries employed on the Western Front. We also chose to bring American and 
German equipment to display on the tunics to illustrate the different equipment used by nations. 
The Germans used leather, the traditional material, for most of their military gear including belts, 
ammunition pouches, backpacks and the liners and chinstraps of the Stahlhelm. The Americans, 
on the other hand, used webbed gear, or woven cloth, for their ammunition pouches and 
backpacks because it was more durable than the traditional leather. We also brought the 
aforementioned artifacts to allow the audience to see what the soldiers on the Western Front 
looked like. Typically when World War I is studied it is through black and white or colorized 
photos or film. We wanted our audience to see what the soldiers would have worn in battle in 
1918 to help the audience connect with a war that is often bypassed in the United States. 
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Figure III.3: A comparison of German and American uniforms and equipment as would have  
been seen in 1918 on the Western Front. 
 
 We also brought helmets based on the same idea of the tunics. We wanted to show our 
audience different perspectives and different styles of helmets used by different nations 
throughout the war. For example, we brought a German M1895 Pickelhaube to illustrate the 
early perception of the war. In 1914, militaries were still based on the Napoleonic style of dress 
as well as tactics, emphasizing artillery barrages and massed infantry charges. The Pickelhaube, 
with its polished brass fittings offered little protection and was unsuited for modern war. This led 
to the development of the modern steel helmets, the Adrian, Brodie and Stahlhelm. The Adrian 
helmet, first employed by the French in the fall of 1915 was designed to offer all around 
protection for troops, though it did not offer a lot of protection for the neck. The Brodie helmet, 
first employed in 1916 by the British and later used by the Americans, offered protection against 
shrapnel and overhead shells but offered little protection against fragments exploding close to the 
ground. Finally, the German Stahlhelm, introduced in 1916, offered all around protection and 
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employed more steel than the Adrian and Brodie helmets, however, the shape of the Stahlhelm 
resulted in a bell-like ringing for soldiers wearing the helmet if a shell exploded nearby. In our 
exhibit, we wanted to show these differences as well as the different colors and sizes of the 
helmets to give the audience a better perspective on the various styles of helmets nations 
employed during the war and how they were developed.  
We also brought in artifacts that had significant history to help the audience relate to the 
war. One set of artifacts we brought consisted of an American tunic, overseas cap, gas mask, 
trousers, puttees and a service certificate all belonging to one soldier from Boston, Massachusetts 
as seen in Figure III.4. The soldier lost his leg during the war and this collection of artifacts gave 
the audience a chance to connect with one of the approximately 20 million soldiers who were 
wounded during World War I. Another historic artifact we brought in was a death plaque given 
to the next of kin of a British sailor killed during the war. This soldier was killed only a few days 
after Britain entered the war in 1914 and he served on the H.M.S. Amphion, first British ship 
sunk during World War I.  
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Figure III.4: The tunic, overseas cap, pants, and gas mask of Pvt. Nicholas Caprio. Pvt. 
Caprio was from Boston, Massachusetts and lost his leg during the war. 
 
 
Figure III.5: The Death Plaque and documents of Stoker 1st Class Robert Ashton who 
was killed when the H.M.S. Amphion struck a German mine on August 6th, 1914. The H.M.S. 
Amphion was the first British ship sunk during World War I. 
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Taking into account our IQP focused on the evolution of gas and chemical warfare during 
World War I, we included them in the center of our exhibit. Similar to the tunics, the gas masks 
were meant to show the different ways militaries protected their soldiers during World War I. 
For example, the German Ledermaske and Gummimaske are extremely similar to each other, 
barring a few small changes, and are similar to some styles of modern gas masks, while the U.S. 
and Britain used a multistage filter in a canister to protect from gas. Our exhibit wanted to show 
that even though the approach to defending against gas was different, the gas masks still 
performed the same task: protect the soldiers. 
 
Figure III.6: Examples of German and American gas masks from World War I. From 
left to right: German M17 Ledermaske, German M15 Gummimaske, American Small Box 
Respirator. 
 
We also chose some artifacts for their notoriety or fame within the First World War. We 
chose to bring the famous “Remember Belgium” poster by Ellsworth Young not only because 
the poster is famous for capturing German brutality during the war, but also to contribute to our 
main essay where we consider just war theory and the idea of fighting a war fairly. Another 
artifact we brought was a complete Princess Mary Tin smoker’s set from 1914. This artifact is 
from one of the most famous events of World War I: the Christmas Truce. A few days before 
Christmas in 1914, there was a spontaneous truce across the Western Front between the British, 
French and Germans. During this truce, soldiers fraternized, drank, smoked and played soccer 
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matches. This event represented one of last moments of humanity during the war.  After this 
event, leaders of the warring European nations issued declarations stating soldiers fraternizing 
would be shot. Though some spontaneous truces sprung up during Christmas of 1915, they were 
not on the same scale as the 1914 truces.  
 
Figure III.7: A complete example of a Princess Mary Tin smoker’s set, as issued to 
British troops during Christmas 1914. 
 
Finally, we chose to bring a British copy of the German medal commemorating the 
sinking of the Lusitania. This artifact, used as a propaganda tool by the British and sold for one 
shilling, was meant to increase public support against the Germans after the liner H.M.S. 
Lusitania was sunk by a U-Boat just off the English coast. The British claimed the Lusitania was 
only a passenger ship and was not carrying war material and the Germans violated international 
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law and sunk it without warning. This event signalled a shift in American trade and perception of 
the Germans. Until this point, the U.S. traded with both the Entente and Central Powers, but after 
this event, which claimed the lives of some 120 Americans, the U.S. traded almost exclusively 
with the Entente Powers.  In the U.S., perception of the Germans also changed as Americans 
became more suspicious of Germans, even those living in the United States. This contributed to 
the passage of Prohibition in the 1920’s as many of the breweries in the U.S. were German 
owned.     
 
Figure III.8: An example of the British copy of the German medal commemorating the 
sinking of the Lusitania. This example retains its original box as well as the pamphlet pointing 
out key features on the medal as well as accusing the Germans of premeditating the attack. 
 
Overall, we chose artifacts to bring to the exhibit not only based on their relevance to our 
project but also based on their appearance, origin, fame, notoriety, and significance within the 
context of the First World War. 
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Hosting the Exhibit: 
 The first day of the exhibit fell on Friday, November 9th, and started slightly later than 
the advertised time because it took us longer to unpack and set up all of the artifacts than we had 
initially planned. Bringing the artifacts up to the top floor of the library did not take very much 
time, but because only one of our group members had any prior experience manipulating and 
displaying the artifacts the set up took about an hour longer than expected. 
 Much of the equipment required special care to manipulate and often came with 
unexpected challenges that impeded our progress during the setup. For instance, one of the 
artifacts that we brought was an American military coat complete with its backpack and gas 
mask. The coat was fairly easy to place on the mannequin, but the challenge came when we 
placed the backpack on the mannequin only to find that it caused the display to become top 
heavy enough that it could not stand on its own. Similarly, many of the gas masks, while most 
were still flexible enough to be opened, were stiff. Their rigidity made it difficult to open them 
up enough that visitors to the exhibit would be able to see the masks properly, and we struggled 
to keep them open while taking care to not destroy any of the masks.  
 While the exhibit was not completely ready by the advertised time, that did not prevent 
some onlookers from asking questions about the artifacts as we were unpacking them. Some of 
the people who came during the setup were actually able to see different aspects of the 
equipment than would be visible on a static display. The main example that we recall was being 
able to show some of the inner markings on one of the American coats which showed the 
soldier’s name in faded pen.  
 Once the exhibit was completely set up, we were able to spend more time actively 
looking for questions to answer and were able to point out some of the more subtle aspects of 
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some of the artifacts. The exhibit was not set up to have any particular flow to it, but over time 
we saw that there were a few artifacts that stood out to most people. We found that most people 
had taken an interest two distinct parts of the exhibit: the French coat and the American machine 
gunner coat. 
The French coat was actually the newest addition to our group member’s collection. The 
coat was obtained about two weeks before the start of the exhibit and it seemed to be the most 
eye catching artifact that we brought. When we spoke to a few visitors to the exhibit, we noticed 
that most people seemed to like the sky blue color of the coat compared to the gray of the 
German coat and the yellowish-green of the American coats. An interesting encounter we had 
was when one student that was actually from France took an interest in the coat. She said she 
was very happy to see a display on the First World War since the United States tends to focus 
more on the Second World War than the first.  
The American machine gunner coat did not seem to interest people very much at first 
because of its color, but the story behind the coat seemed to be a uniquely interesting aspect of it. 
Our group discovered the interest when we saw more than a few people all looking at what 
appeared to be a long sock next to the coat, but nobody seemed to know what it was. People 
grew very interested when we told them that it was actually more like a compression sock that 
the soldier who the coat belonged to would have placed over his leg stump after it had been 
amputated. Our group did not know exactly how the soldier lost his leg, but we were able to 
explain that it was likely for him to have lost it during an artillery strike due to his position as a 
machine gunner. We were fortunate that we brought that artifact because it allowed us to show a 
more personal side to the war while also explaining some of the military logistics of the time, 
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and many people may have felt a small personal connection to the soldier because he had also 
been from Massachusetts. 
Not all of the visitors to our exhibit were students, we also had a few history professors 
view the displays and ask questions. There were some major differences between how most 
students saw the exhibit and how most of the professors viewed it, as the professors universally 
read every word we had written on every artifact and did not hesitate to ask questions if 
something interesting caught their eye. Many of the questions that the professors asked were also 
directed at our own views of the war rather than any individual artifact. For instance, some 
professors asked us what we found to be the most interesting part of the war or why we decided 
to host the exhibit in the first place.  
Between the two days that the exhibit was up, not very much changed in terms of the 
questions people asked or what people found interesting, but there was one encounter that 
spanned both days and was the most unique experience for our group during the event. Soon 
after the displays were put up on the first day of the exhibit, a professor started looking at the 
displays and began asking us questions about the various artifacts and our own interests in the 
Great War. We all initially believed that he was a history professor, but learned later that he was 
actually a mechanical engineering professor who just had a strong interest in the topic. He 
informed us that his father had served in the Second World War on a boat that was originally 
built in the First World War, and that his grandfather was part of the United States cavalry during 
the Great War. He spoke to us as a group for what was probably close to half an hour before 
leaving, but informed us before he left that he was going to search for his grandfather’s riding 
crop that he possessed. Towards the end of the second day, he visited our exhibit again, but 
brought a briefcase with him. Inside his briefcase he showed us not only the riding crop, which 
97 
 
somehow still had its suede lining, but also an antique book which had listed the date his father’s 
military ship was built. This encounter was probably the most interesting to our group because it 
was the only time during the event where we were saw a direct connection between the war and 
the present. Not only did we hear an interesting account of someone’s family in the war, but we 
also were able to see an artifact from that story and documentation that showed the flow from the 
First World War into the second and finally into the modern day.  
 
Data Analysis: 
After the conclusion of the exhibit, we gathered the surveys that were completed and 
analyzed the results. We created graphs to help organize the data from the first page of the 
survey into a more easily understandable form.  
 
 
Figure III.9: This pie chart shows the results from Question 1 on the survey. 
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Figure III.9  shows the breakdown of the responses for the first question of the survey. The 
results suggest that the vast majority of people are not complete pacifists, and believe that the act 
of war itself is not necessarily unjustifiable.  
 
 
Figure III.10: This pie chart shows the results from Question 2 on the survey. 
 
Figure III.10 shows the results from the second question, which asked whether the ends always 
justify the means. The data is about what our group had expected to receive, as it suggests that 
the vast majority of people do not believe that anything should be done in war even if it could 
result in victory. When combined with the responses from the question about the justifiability of 
war, the two charts suggest that the majority of respondents do not hold an all-or-nothing view of 
war; most believe that war can be justified, but that war does not permit certain actions. 
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Figure III.11: A box and whisker plot showing the results from Question 3 on the survey, which 
asked participants to rank the ethicacy of certain weapons from 1 to 7. 
 
Figure III.11 shows a box and whisker plot for the ethicacy of each form of weaponry. 
The graph shows that modern responses elicit that nuclear and biological weapons are considered 
to be only slightly worse than chemical weapons. Some errors may have been made during the 
collection of this data, since the ordering we expected was the order that we placed the responses 
in, which may have indicated a preferred order in the minds of some respondents. Similarly, the 
exclusion of chemical weapons from the nuclear and biological weapons helps signify them as 
being different than the other two, which may have indicated to some people that they should 
respond with chemical weapons on a lower number since the three are usually grouped together 
as weapons of mass destruction.  
100 
 
 
Figure III.12: This box and whisker plot illustrates the results from Question 4 on the survey. 
 
Figure III.12 shows a box and whisker plot for the answers to the fourth question. The 
graph above shows that there was not a clear consensus amongst the respondents as to the 
ordering of the effectiveness of the weapons. While the effectiveness of various technologies 
were debatable, e.g. Tanks vs Flamethrowers, it was clear that many of the respondents did not 
understand how significant Artillery was. The results to the question may indicate that many of 
the respondents were not very knowledgeable of the First World War. 
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Figure III.13: This box and whisker plot displays the results from Question 5 from the survey. 
 
Our results from the previous question suggest that people believe Chemical Weapons 
were seen as more controversial than all of the other listed weapons during the First World War.  
Our data collection process had notable flaws that likely influenced some of the data. For 
instance, the survey was designed to be filled out partially before seeing the exhibit and asking 
questions and partially after, but some people filled out both parts of the survey after having seen 
the exhibit. Any extra knowledge gained during the exhibit may not be representative of the 
knowledge that an average modern American would know or think about the Great War, and so 
the results may be skewed slightly in favor of the results that our group was expecting to find. 
Similarly, some respondents found it difficult to keep track of the way each question was 
supposed to be answered. For instance, some did not realize that ranking a list means that only 
one item from the list can be any given number, or in other cases people numbered their choices 
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backwards. For the cases where the numbering was backwards, the order was reversed before 
being entered because our group believed it was obvious enough when this occurred that the data 
did not need to be thrown away. Instances where the data was obviously backwards were 
indicated by responses that said, for instance, that hand to hand combat was a less moral way of 
fighting than using nuclear weapons, and every response past hand to hand combat was 
perceived as more ethical rather than the expected less ethical.  
 Finally, some visitors to the exhibit did not fill out survey responses before leaving, 
creating an error that did not impact the quality of the data received but did impact the quantity. 
Our group does not have data to reflect the experiences of the people who did not fill out 
surveys, nor do we have data to reflect how many people did not fill out the survey before 
leaving, though estimates based on memory indicate that perhaps as many as 30% of people did 
not fill them out.  
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Reflections: 
 Overall, the experience of hosting an exhibit was definitely worthwhile both for our own 
interest and our IQP. The data that we gathered, while not perfect, is still usable in our discussion 
and helps us understand how people today look back on the Great War.  
 If we were to host an exhibit again, we would probably do most things the same way, but 
we would definitely advertise it earlier and more vigorously. We would also try to talk more to 
people earlier when one of us thinks they are interested in an artifact, as most of the long 
conversations we had with people came after we spoke first.  
In terms of our own personal growth, hosting the exhibit helped us all understand the 
history of the First World War better by requiring us to relay our knowledge to others. This 
experience showed us how even the smallest details can be every bit as important as the overall 
event when it comes to understanding the nuances of history.  
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Figure III.14: Page 1 of the Survey 
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Figure III.15: Page 2 of the Survey  
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